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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Risk management in general and credit risk analysis in particular has been the focus of extensive
research in the past several years. Credit risk is the dominant source of risk for banks and the
subject of strict regulatory oversight and policy debate. More recently, the proposal by the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS) to reform the regulation of bank capital for credit risk (known
as the New Basel Accord, or BIS 2) has initiated debates on a number of issues in the literature.1
One of the issues under discussion centers on the eﬀects of business cycles, especially of severe
economic downturns, on bank risk and value-at-risk capital requirements (Carpenter, Whitesell
and Zakrajšek 2001, Carey 2002, Allen and Saunders 2004). However, this discussion has been
taking place largely without the beneﬁt of an explicit model that links the loss distribution of a
bank’s credit portfolio to the evolution of directly observable macroeconomic factors at national
and global levels. Given the increasing interdependencies in the global economy, risk managers of
commercial and central banks alike may well be interested in questions like “What would be the
impact on the credit loss distribution of a given bank (or banks) in a given region if there were
large unfavorable shocks to equity prices, GDP or interest rates in that or other regions?”
The purpose of this paper is to show how global macroeconometric models can be linked to
ﬁrm speciﬁc return processes which are an integral part of Merton-type credit risk models so that
quantitative answers to such questions can be obtained. We propose a combined model of credit
losses contingent on the macroeconomy that is able to distinguish between default (and loss) due to
systematic versus idiosyncratic (or ﬁrm speciﬁc) shocks, providing an explicit channel for modeling
default correlations. This enables us to conduct simulation experiments on the eﬀect of changes in
observable macroeconomic dynamics on credit risk.
In providing such a linkage, the main conceptual challenge is to allow for ﬁrm-speciﬁc business
cycle eﬀects and the heterogeneity of default probabilities across ﬁrms. Standard credit risk models
pioneered by Vasicek (1987) and elaborated in Vasicek (1991, 2002) and Gordy (2003), adapt the
option-based approach of Merton (1974) and allow for business cycle eﬀects generally via one or
more unobserved systematic risk factors. They assume that the processes generating asset values
and the default thresholds are homogeneous across ﬁrms. The parameters of the loss distribution
are then identiﬁed by ﬁxing the cross-ﬁrm correlation of asset returns and the mean default rate
of the credit portfolio. Operational versions of the Vasicek model, e.g. by KMV, allow for ﬁrm
heterogeneity by making use of balance sheets, income statements and other similar reports issued
by the ﬁrm. This process inevitably involves a certain degree of subjective evaluation, however,
and the outcome is generally proprietary information.2
1For details of BIS 2 see BIS (2001, 2004), and for an account of the debates see, for example, Jones and Mingo
(1998), and Altman, Bharath and Saunders (2002).
2C r e d i tp o r t f o l i om o d e l sa l s od i ﬀer in the way they model changes to the ﬁrms’ value. Some models operate on a
mark-to-market basis by looking at the change of market value of credit assets based on credit migration and the term
2Examples of credit risk portfolio models in the professional literature include Gupton, Finger
and Bhatia’s (1997) CreditMetrics, KMV’s PortfolioManager, and the actuarial approach employed
by CSFB’s CreditRisk+ (Credit Suisse First Boston 1997) where the key risk driver is the variable
mean default rate in the economy. Wilson’s (1997a,b) model (CreditPortfolioView) is an exception.
He allows for the macroeconomic variables to inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s probability of default using a pooled
logit speciﬁcation. However, because the defaults are grouped, typically by industry, and modeled at
the (single country) national level, any ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity is lost in the estimation process.
For detailed comparisons, see Koyluoglu and Hickman (1998), Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2000),
Gordy (2000) and Saunders and Allen (2002).
In this paper we depart from the literature in two important respects. First, we model individual
ﬁrm returns (taken as proxies for changes in asset values) in terms of a number of directly observable
contemporaneous risk factors, such as changes in equity indices, interest rates, inﬂation, real money
balances, oil prices and output, both domestic and foreign. In this way we allow for the possible
diﬀerential impacts of macroeconomic factors on the evolution of ﬁrm’s asset values, and as such
their default probabilities. Second, using historical observations on mean returns, volatility and
default frequencies of ﬁrms for a particular credit rating, we compute ﬁrm-speciﬁc default threshold-
equity ratios under the assumption that two ﬁrms with identical credit ratings are likely to have
similar default threshold-equity ratios. Thus we are able to provide an empirical implementation
of the Merton model using only two pieces of publicly available information for each ﬁrm, namely
market returns and credit ratings, in a multi-country setting.
The problem of obtaining accurate information about the health of a ﬁrm, while not new, is
particularly relevant for modeling ﬁrms’ bankruptcy or default. Our approach has the advantage
that it does not rely on ﬁrm-speciﬁc accounting data which are at best noisy and at worst biased
due to the information asymmetries between company managers (agents) and share/debt holders
(principals). Rating agencies are likely to have access to private information about the ﬁrm’s past
performance and its current management, in addition to public information from balance sheets and
company reports, in arriving at their ﬁrm-speciﬁc credit ratings. In the pursuit of better ratings,
companies have more of an incentive to reveal (some of) their private information to the credit
rating agencies than to their debt-holders, very much in the same spirit that second—hand car dealers
have the incentive to reveal information about the cars they oﬀer for sale by the duration of the
guarantees and other after-sales services that they provide. Moreover, basing the analysis strictly
on accounting data would make it diﬃcult to harmonize information across diﬀerent accounting
standards and bankruptcy codes from diﬀerent countries, a source of heterogeneity presumably
addressed by rating agencies.
structure of credit spreads (CreditMetrics). Others focus on predicting default losses (so-called default mode models
such as CSFB’s CreditRisk+). Yet there are other approaches that allow for both (e.g. KMV’s PortfolioManager,
Wilson’s CreditPortfolioView).
3In short, in our framework the portfolio loss distribution is driven by ﬁrms’ credit ratings and
how their returns are tied to business cycles, both domestic and foreign, and how business cycles are
linked across countries. This is in contrast to credit risk analyses that explicitly focus on modeling
of individual ﬁrm defaults, using panel probit or logit speciﬁcations (Altman and Saunders 1997,
Lennox 1999). Since defaults are rare, to obtain sensible estimates these applications tend to impose
strong homogeneity assumptions on the parameters, which could bias the estimates. For instance,
it is impossible to allow for any ﬁrm-speciﬁc( e . g .ﬁxed) eﬀects. The probit/logit approach is also
diﬃcult to adapt for the analysis of multi-period credit loss distributions, whilst our approach can
be readily extended for such purposes.3
To link the ﬁrm-speciﬁc returns to business cycle factors we shall make use of the global vector
autoregressive (GVAR) macroeconometric model recently developed by Pesaran, Schuermann and
Weiner (2004) — hereafter PSW. This model is composed of vector error-correcting models (VECM)
estimated for individual countries (or regions), which are then combined into a global model that
takes account of both intra- and inter-country/regional interactions. The model uses domestic
macroeconomic variables such as GDP, inﬂation, the level of short term interest rates, exchange
rate, equity prices (when applicable) and real money balances. These are related to corresponding
foreign variables constructed exclusively to match the international trade pattern of the country
under consideration. Because of the global nature of the model, we can analyze how a shock to
one speciﬁcm a c r o e c o n o m i cv a r i a b l ea ﬀects other macroeconomic variables, even (and especially)
across countries, as well as shocks to risk factors, e.g. oil prices, aﬀecting all regions.
We examine the credit risk of a ﬁctitious corporate loan portfolio and its exposure to a wide
range of observable risk factors in the global economy. We model a ﬁrm’s probability of default as
a function of those risk factors but assume for simplicity that loss given default is an exogenously
given random variable whose speciﬁc parameterization can vary by country. Using the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
return regressions and the GVAR model, single- and multi-period credit loss distributions of a given
portfolio are then obtained through Monte Carlo simulations.
Our baseline expected losses are quite reasonable when compared with actual industry loan
charge-oﬀs. For example, expected loss over the course of four quarters is about 58bp (basis
points) of exposure, compared with 89bp, the average net charge-oﬀs( l o a n sc h a r g e do ﬀ less amount
recovered over total loans) for the U.S. banking industry from 1987 to 2003. When compared with
the actual industry charge-oﬀs matched by our forecast horizon, namely 2000Q1, the diﬀerence is
even smaller: those were 56bp (at an annual rate). Much of the fat-tailedness of our loss distribution
is, however, due to the relatively small number of ﬁrms (119 in our portfolio) which entails a
substantial degree of diversiﬁable idiosyncratic risk. Once this is controlled for (by including ‘copies’
of the existing ﬁrms within the portfolio), the EL to VaR multiples are in line with those obtained
by others (e.g. Carey 2002 who has about 500 exposures). For instance, the tail values at 99% and
3A recent exception is Duﬃe and Wang (2003) who forecast default intensities over multiple periods.
499.5% are around three to four times expected losses. Moreover, when we impose extreme shocks
such as those seen during the Great Depression, VaR is more than triple the baseline scenario,
also consistent with Carey’s results. We ﬁnd further that symmetric shocks to the observable risk
factors do not result in correspondingly symmetric loss outcomes reﬂecting the nonlinear nature of
the credit risk model.
In attempting to provide a formal link between credit risk and the macro-economy we have
been forced to make many diﬃcult choices. First, we conﬁned our analysis to publicly traded
companies with a suﬃciently long credit rating history. We assume that this credit rating is a
suﬃcient summary statistic of unconditional default risk, meaning that we take credit ratings as the
business cycle-neutral, ‘common currency’ of default risk across diﬀerent geographies, legislations
and accounting standards. But we allow for ﬁrm-speciﬁc conditional default probabilities over the
course of the business cycle. To do this we need three diﬀerent tools: (i) a model of the systematic
(macroeconomic) risk factors, (ii) ﬁrm returns and how they are linked to those factors, and (iii)
ﬁrm default thresholds. The GVAR satisﬁes the ﬁrst requirement, and the link to ﬁr m si sd o n e
through ﬁrm-level return regressions by allowing the loadings on the macro-variables to be ﬁrm
speciﬁc. The default thresholds are identiﬁed by assuming that they are the same within a rating
category.4 Clearly, other modeling strategies and identiﬁcation schemes can be adopted. The
present paper demonstrates that such an approach to credit risk modeling is in fact feasible.
Our model is particularly suited for an international and multi-factor interpretation of the
standard corporate ﬁnance view of ﬁrm risk: total risk is the sum of systematic and idiosyncratic
(i.e. ﬁrm-speciﬁc) risk. The GVAR is ostensibly a global model of systematic risk and its dynamics.
Having a model of those factor dynamics can go a long way to understanding ﬁrm risk (and
return) characteristics and to address speciﬁc risk management related questions. One which we
ﬁnd particularly valuable is the ability to rank-order possible shock scenarios. Given a particular
portfolio of credit exposures, is a 1σ shock (one standard error shock) to Japanese money supply
more damaging (or beneﬁcial, depending on the sign of the shock) than a 1σ shock to South East
Asian or U.S. equity markets? What will the portfolio loss distribution look like one year from
now? What if the portfolio changes? Such counterfactual questions are central to policy analysis,
be it by commercial or central bankers who might wish to investigate the impact on a representative
bank portfolio in their country of various economic shocks in other countries. If the model is not
compact enough, it cannot be practically used in this repetitive fashion.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the alternative
4The bankruptcy models of Altman (1968), Lennox (1999) and Shumway (2001) generate ﬁrm speciﬁcd e f a u l t
forecasts, as does the industry model by KMV (Kealhofer and Kurbat (2002)). However, all of these studies impose
more signiﬁcant parameter homogeneity than we do, and they focus on just one country at a time (the U.S. and
U.K in this list), and thus do not address the formidable challenges of point in time bankruptcy forecasting with a
multi-country portfolio.
5approaches to credit portfolio modeling and puts forward our proposed approach. Section 3 brieﬂy
discusses the GVAR model and shows how it is linked to the credit risk model. Mathematical
expressions for the conditional one-period and multi-period loss distributions of a given credit
portfolio under various shock scenarios are also obtained. Section 4 provides an empirical analysis
of the impact of the diﬀerent types of shocks (to output, money supply, equity and oil prices) on
the loss distribution. Section 5 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Credit Portfolio Modeling
Credit risk modeling is concerned with the tail properties of the loss distribution for a given portfolio
of credit assets such as loans or bonds, and attempts to provide quantitative analysis of the extent
to which the loss distribution varies with changes to ﬁrm/industry-speciﬁc, national and global
risk factors. It can be approached from the perspective of the individual loans that make up the
portfolio, or it could be addressed by considering the return on the loan portfolio directly. In this
paper we follow the former approach and simulate the portfolio loss distribution from the bottom
up by considering how individual ﬁrms default.
Broadly speaking, there are two important variables describing asset/ﬁrm level credit risk: the
probability of default (PD) and the loss given default (LGD).5 Most of the work on PD and
LGD has been done without explicit conditioning on business cycle variables; exceptions include
Carey (1998), Frye (2000) and Altman, Brady, Resti and Sironi (2002). These studies ﬁnd, perhaps
not surprisingly, that losses are indeed worse in recessions. Tapping into information contained
in equity returns (as opposed to credit spreads from debt instruments), Vassalou and Xing (2004)
show that default risk varies with the business cycle.6 Carey (2002), using re-sampling techniques,
shows that mean losses during a recession such as 1990/91 in the U.S. are about the same as losses
in the 0.5% tail during an expansion. Bangia et al. (2002), using a regime switching approach, ﬁnd
that capital held by banks over a one-year horizon needs to be 25-30% higher in a recession that
in an expansion.
In this paper we shall consider the loss distribution of the credit portfolio of a ﬁnancial institution
such as a bank by conditioning on observable macroeconomic variables or factors. The conditional
loss distribution allows for the eﬀect of business cycle variations and captures such eﬀects at a global
level by explicitly taking account of the heterogeneous interconnections and interdependencies that
exist between national and international factors.
5The New Basel Accord explicitly mentions two additional variables: exposure at default and maturity. As these
aﬀect credit risk only moderately (and are often taken to be non-stochastic), our discussion will focus on the PDand
LGD which are the two dominant determinants of the credit loss distribution.
6See also the survey by Allen and Saunders (2004).
62.1 A Merton-Based Model of Default
Following Merton (1974), a ﬁrm is expected to default when the value of its assets falls below a
threshold value determined by its callable liabilities. The lender is eﬀectively writing a put option
on the assets of the borrowing ﬁr m . I ft h ev a l u eo ft h eﬁrm falls below a certain threshold, the
owners will put the ﬁrm to the debt-holders.7 Default, as considered by the rating agencies and
banks, typically constitutes non-payment of interest or a coupon.8
Thus there are three aspects which require modeling: (i) the evolution of ﬁrm value, (ii) the
default threshold, and in a portfolio context, (iii) return correlations across ﬁrms in the portfolio.
We discuss the ﬁrst two aspects in this section, while modeling of return correlations is treated
in Section 3.2. In Merton-type portfolio models, such as KMV, asset value and asset volatility
are typically derived from balance sheet data as well as observable equity returns and (estimated)
return volatility (see Kealhofer and Kurbat 2002). The default threshold in these models is typically
taken to be short term debt plus a proportion of long term debt. Asset value, asset volatility and
the default threshold are then used to determine the distance from default. In what follows we
advance an alternative approach where instead of using balance sheet data we make use of ﬁrm
credit ratings.
Consider a ﬁrm j in country or region i having asset values Vji,t at time t, and an outstanding
stock of debt, Dji,t. Under the Merton (1974) model default occurs at the maturity date of the
debt, t + H,i ft h eﬁrm’s assets, Vji,t+H, are less than the face value of the debt at that time,
Dji,t+H. T h i si si nc o n t r a s tw i t ht h eﬁrst-passage models where default would occur the ﬁrst
time that Vji,t falls below a default boundary (or threshold) over the period t to t + H.9 The
default probabilities are computed with respect to the probability distribution of asset values at
the terminal date, t + H in the case of the Merton model, and over the period from t to t + H in
t h ec a s eo ft h eﬁrst-passage model. The Merton approach may be thought of as a European option
and the ﬁrst-passage approach as an American option. Our approach can be adapted to both of
these models, but in what follows we focus on Merton’s speciﬁcation.
The value of the ﬁrm at time t is the sum of debt and equity, namely
Vji,t = Dji,t + Eji,t, with Dji,t > 0, (1)
7For a discussion of the power of Merton default prediction models see Falkenstein and Boral (2001) and Gemmill
(2002) who ﬁnd that the Merton model generally does well in predicting default (Falkenstein and Boral) and credit
spreads (Gemmill). Duﬀee (1999) points out that due to the continuous time diﬀusion processes underlying the Black
Scholes formula, short-term default probabilities may be underestimated.
8A similar default condition is used by regulators, e.g. in the New Basel Accord. See Section III.F, §146 in BIS
(2001).
9The ﬁrst-passage approach is discussed in Black and Cox (1976). For a review see, for example, Duﬃea n d
Singleton (2003, Section 3.2). More recent modeling approaches also allow for strategic default considerations, as in








Conditional on time t information, default will take place at time t + H if
Vji,t+H ≤ Dji,t+H,




Equation (3) is restrictive in that it requires equity values to be negative before default occurs. Aside
from non-trivial practical considerations having to do with arriving at an independent estimate
of Vji,t, there are several reasons behind relaxing this condition. Because default is costly and
violations to the absolute priority rule in bankruptcy proceedings are so common, in practice
shareholders have an incentive to put the ﬁrm into receivership even before the equity value of
the ﬁrm hits zero.10 In fact, several authors have found that in 65% to 80% of bankruptcies, even
shareholders receive something without debt-holders necessarily having been fully paid oﬀ (see, for
instance, Eberhart and Weiss 1998, and references therein). Moreover, we see in practice that equity
values remain positive for insolvent ﬁrms. Similarly, the bank might also have an incentive of forcing
the ﬁrm to default once the ﬁrm’s equity falls below a non-zero threshold, as well as an incentive
to bypass the costly proceedings by agreeing to terms that yield positive value to the shareholders
themselves.11 The value of equity incorporates not only the asset values, but an option value that
a ﬁrm in default may in fact recover before creditors take control of these assets. Finally, default
in a credit relationship is typically a weaker condition than outright bankruptcy. An obligor may
meet the technical default condition, e.g. a missed coupon payment, without subsequently going
into bankruptcy. This distinction is particularly relevant in the banking-borrower relationship we
seek to characterize.12
In what follows we assume that default takes place if
0 <E ji,t+H <C ji,t+H, (4)
where Cji,t+H is a positive default threshold which could vary over time and with the ﬁrm’s par-
ticular characteristics (such as region or industry sector). Natural candidates include quantitative
factors such as leverage, proﬁtability, ﬁrm age and perhaps size (most of which appear in models of
ﬁrm default), as well as more qualitative factors such as management quality.13 Obviously some of
10See, for instance, Leland and Toft (1996) who develop a model where default is determined endogenously without
imposing a positive net worth condition.
11For a treatment of this scenario, see Garbade (2001).
12An excellent example of the joint borrower-lender decision process is given by Lawrence and Arshadi (1995).
13For models of bankruptcy and default at the ﬁrm level, see, for instance, Altman (1968), Lennox (1999), Shumway
(2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt (2004), as well as a survey by Altman
and Saunders (1997).
8these factors will be easier to observe and measure than others. The observable accounting-based
factors are at best noisy and at worst could be biased, highlighting the information asymmetry
between managers (agents) and share/debt-holders (principals).14
Although our objective is not to build a default model per se, we face the same measurement
diﬃculties and information asymmetries. To overcome them, we make use of the credit rating of
a ﬁrm which we denote by R.15 This will help us speciﬁcally in estimating the default thresholds
needed in the determination of the default probabilities. Naturally, rating agencies have access
to, and presumably make use of, private information about the ﬁrm to arrive at their ﬁrm-speciﬁc
credit rating, in addition to incorporating public information such as balance sheet information
and, of course, equity returns. Thus we make the assumption that rating agencies benchmark their
ratings on past returns and volatilities of all ﬁrms that have been rated R in the past.
Consider then a particular R−rated ﬁrm at time t, and assume that in arriving at their rating
the credit rating agency uses the following standard geometric random walk model of equity values:
ln(ER,t+1)=l n ( ERt)+µR + σRηR,t+1,η R,t+1 ∼ IIDN(0,1), (5)
with a non-zero drift, µR, and idiosyncratic Gaussian innovations with a zero mean and ﬁxed
volatility, σR.16 We assume that conditional on data at time t,aﬁrm’s rating does not change over
the horizon (t,t + H), namely




and by (4) default occurs if
ln(ER,t+H)=l n ( ERt)+HµR + σR
H X
s=1
ηR,t+s < ln(CR,t+H), (6)












Equation (7) tells us that the relative (rather than absolute) decline in ﬁr mv a l u em u s tb el a r g e
enough over the horizon H to result in default, meaning it is independent of the size of the ﬁrm.
Firm size is an input to the credit rating determination; a small ﬁrm would need a larger equity
cushion to withstand a given shocks than a large ﬁrm with the same rating.
14With this in mind, Duﬃe and Lando (2001) allow for the possibility of imperfect information about the ﬁrm’s
assets and default threshold in the context of a ﬁrst-passage model.
15R may take on values such as ’Aaa’, ’Aa’, ’Baa’,..., ’Caa’ in Moody’s terminology, or ’AAA’, ’AA’, ’BBB’,...,
’CCC’ in S&P’s terminology.
16Clearly non-Gaussian innovations can also be considered. But for quarterly data that we shall be working with
Gausssian innovations seems a good ﬁrst approximation.
9Under the assumption that the evolution of ﬁrm equity value follows (5), ln(ER,t+H/ERt) may










Therefore, the default probability for the R−rated ﬁrms at the terminal date t + H is given by
πR(t,H)=Φ
µ






where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Denote the H-period forward
log threshold-equity ratio to be λR(t,H)=l n( CR,t+H/ERt) so that





is the quantile associated with the default probability πR(t,H).
An estimate of λR(t,H) can now be obtained using past observations on returns, rRt =
ln(ER,t/ER,t−1), and the empirical default frequencies, ˆ πR(t,H),o fR−rated ﬁrms over a given
period of say t =1 ,2,...,T.17 Denoting the estimates of µR and σR by ˆ µR,a n dˆ σR, respectively,
we have
ˆ λR(t,H)=Hˆ µR + ˆ QR(t,H)ˆ σR
√
H, (9)
where ˆ µR and ˆ σ2
R are the mean and standard deviation of returns of ﬁrms with rating R over the
sample period, and18
ˆ QR(t,H)=Φ−1 [ˆ πR(t,H)]. (10)
The estimates of ˆ µR and ˆ σR can also be updated using a rolling window of size 7-8 years (the
average length of the business cycle).
In practice, ˆ πR(t,H) might not provide a reliable estimate of πR(t,H) as it is likely to be based
on very few defaults over any particular period (t,t + H). One possibility would be to use an
average estimate of λR(t,H) obtained over a reasonably long period of 10 to 20 years (on a rolling
basis). For example, based on the sample observations t =1 ,2,...,T,we would have
ˆ λR(H)=H ˆ µR + ˆ QR(H)ˆ σR
√
H, (11)
17An important source of heterogeneity is likely the large variation in bankruptcy laws and regulation across
countries. However, by using rating agency default data, we use their homogeneous deﬁnition of default and are thus
not subject to these heterogeneities.
18In practice where there are many R-rated ﬁrms in a given period, average returns across all R-rated ﬁrms can be
used to estimate ˆ µR. The computation of ˆ σ
2
R is more involved and is described in a note available from the authors
on request.








assuming that rating agencies use about a one-year horizon (H =4quarters) when assessing a
ﬁrm.
The above framework allows us to obtain estimates of the default threshold-equity ratios by
credit ratings. Also, given suﬃcient data for a particular region or country i, one could in principle
use default frequencies that vary across regions/countries and estimate default threshold-equity
ratios that vary across countries and ratings. However, since a particular ﬁrm j’s default is typically
a unique terminal event, multiple (serial) defaults notwithstanding, ﬁrm-speciﬁc default threshold-
equity ratios can not be obtained independently of that ﬁrm’s default probability which we aim to
compute. This presents us with a fundamental identiﬁcation problem which we propose to resolve
by making the following (identiﬁcation) condition:
CjiR,t+H/EjiRt = CR,t+H/ERt,f o ra l lj, (13)
where EjiRt and CjiR,t+H are respectively the equity and the default threshold values of ﬁrm j in
region i, with the credit rating, R,a tt i m et. Condition (13) says that at a given point in time,
any two ﬁrms with the same credit ratings are assumed to have the same default threshold-equity
ratios. Note that we do not assume that they need to have the same threshold levels but just the
same ratio; ﬁrms with the same credit rating but of diﬀerent size will have potentially very diﬀerent
threshold levels.
This problem of identiﬁcation, although quite fundamental, need not be solved by imposing
the same default threshold. For example, instead of imposing that all ﬁrms with the same credit
rating have the same default threshold, one could equally require that all ﬁrms with the same
credit rating to have the same distance to default ratio, namely [λR(t,H) − HµR]/σR
√
H, to be
t h es a m ea c r o s sa l lﬁrms in a given rating category. Also, instead of using credit rating as the sole
type-identiﬁer, one could consider ﬁrms grouped by industry or geographical regions as well as by
their credit ratings. Clearly, other groupings of ﬁrms can also be entertained, so long as one could
plausibly make the argument of within-group homogeneity of either the default threshold or the
distance to default ratio. Further discussions of these alternative identiﬁcation schemes and their
implications for the credit loss distribution although clearly worthwhile, is beyond the scope of the
present paper.
2.2 Firm-SpeciﬁcD e f a u l t s
We are now in a position to develop our ﬁrm-speciﬁc default probability model. Denote the return
of ﬁrm j in region i over the period t to t +1by rji,t+1 =l n ( Eji,t+1/Eji,t), and assume that
11conditional on the information available at time t, Ωt, it can be decomposed as
rji,t+1 = µji,t + ξji,t+1, (14)
where µji,t is the (forecastable) conditional mean, and ξji,t+1 is the (non-forecastable) innovation
component of the return process. The conditional mean will be a function of the regional and
global macroeconomic factors, allowing an avenue through which shocks to these factors aﬀect
ﬁrm returns. The precise form of µji,t, and how it relates to national and global risk factors will
be speciﬁed using the GVAR model to be brieﬂy summarized in Section 3.2. Return correlations
across ﬁrms are captured through µji,t and ξji,t+1 as will be made clear in Section 3.2. Following
the standard Merton model we shall assume that
ξji,t+1 | Ωt ∼ N(0,ω2
ξ,ji). (15)
The assumption that the conditional variance of returns is time-invariant seems reasonable for
quarterly returns, although it would need to be relaxed for returns measured over shorter periods,
such as weeks or days.19
We can now characterize the separation between a default and a non-default state with an
indicator variable
I (ln(Eji,t+1/Eji,t) < ln(Cji,t+1/Eji,t)), or I (rji,t+1 <λ ji(t,1)),
such that, using (7),
I (rji,t+1 <λ ji(t,1)) = 1 if rji,t+1 <λ ji(t,1) =⇒ Default, (16)
I (rji,t+1 <λ ji(t,1)) = 0 if rji,t+1 ≥ λji(t,1) =⇒ No Default.
Using the same approach as above, the one quarter ahead (with H =1 ) default probability for ﬁrm







µji,t and ωξji can be estimated using the ﬁrm-speciﬁc return regressions. λji(t,1) will be estimated
using the rating information of this ﬁrm at time t, under the identiﬁcation condition (13). If the
ﬁrm is rated R,t h e nλji(t,1) will be estimated by ˆ λR(t,1) as in (9), on the assumption that all
R−rated ﬁrms have the same threshold-equity ratio. The default condition for ﬁrm j with credit
rating R can therefore be written as
I
³
rji,t+1 < ˆ λR(t,1)
´
=1if rji,t+1 < ˆ λR(t,1) =⇒ Default. (18)
19Volatility in quarterly models is of third order importance. Our framework could easily be adapted to deal with
more complex volatility eﬀects by normalizing returns with dynamic volatilities using, for example, the RiskMetrics
method or other GARCH speciﬁcations.
12Note that while the default condition is the same for all R−rated ﬁrms, the default probability
varies by ﬁrm. Once again, due to the small number of defaults over a single period (t,t +1 ) ,i n
practice it might be more appropriate to use a (rolling) average estimate such as ˆ λR(H) deﬁned by
(11).
Under (17) the default probability for ﬁrm j, and therefore its distance from default, is driven
by:
1. The ﬁrm’s credit rating: the lower the credit rating, the "closer" the default threshold.
2. The volatility of the equity return, ωξ,ji: the more volatile, the more likely the ﬁrm is to cross
the threshold.
3. The (unconditional) equity return, µji,t: the higher that expected return, the "further" the
ﬁrm is from default.
Mappings from credit ratings to default probabilities are typically obtained using corporate
bond rating histories over many years, often 20 years or more, and thus represent some average
across business cycles. The reason for such long samples is simple: default events for investment
grade ﬁrms are quite rare; for example, the annual default probability of an ‘A’ rated ﬁrm is
approximately one basis point for both Moody’s and S&P rated ﬁrms.20
In the literature, the use and interpretation of credit ratings are somewhat ambiguous. One
interpretation is that they are “cycle-neutral” (Saunders and Allen 2002, Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson
and Tsomocos 2002, Amato and Furﬁne 2004; Carpenter, Whitesell and Zakrajšek 2001 point to
some of the ambiguities), meaning that ratings are assigned only on the basis of ﬁrm-speciﬁci n f o r -
mation and not systematic or macroeconomic information.21 The rating agency’s own description
of their rating methodology broadly supports this view.
(Moody’s 1999, p.6,7): “.. [O]ne of Moody’s goals is to achieve stable expected [italics
in original] default rates across rating categories and time.” ... “Moody’s believes that
giving only a modest weight to cyclical conditions best serves the interests of the bulk
of investors.”
(S&P 2001, p.41): “Standard & Poor’s credit ratings are meant to be forward looking;
... Accordingly, the anticipated ups and downs of business cycles — whether industry-
speciﬁc or related to the general economy — should be factored into the credit rating all
along.” ... “The ideal is to rate ‘through the cycle’”.
20For an overview of the rating industry, see Cantor and Packer (1995); Jafry and Schuermann (2004) provide
detailed default probability estimates by rating.
21Amato and Furﬁne (2003) ﬁnd little evidence of procyclicality in ratings.
13However, there is ample evidence to suggest that credit ratings and associated default probabil-
ities vary systematically with the business cycle (e.g. Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto 2000, Bangia
et al. 2002). Moody’s itself has changed its rating process in this regard (Moody’s 1999, p.6):
“Moody’s has been striving for some time to increase the responsiveness of its ratings to economic
developments.” Our mapping from default experience to thresholds allows for this time variation.
The GVAR model provides the link between changes in macroeconomic variables (in region i and
globally) through µji,t, and it does so uniquely for each ﬁrm to allow for ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity.
The main advantage of using the GVAR as a driver for a credit portfolio model is that it provides
the (conditional) correlation structure among macroeconomic variables of the global economy.
3 Conditional Credit Risk Modeling
3.1 The Macroeconomic Engine: GVAR
T h em a c r o e c o n o m i ce n g i n ed r i v i n gt h ec r e d i tr isk model is described in detail in PSW. We only
provide a very brief, non-technical overview here. The GVAR is a global quarterly model estimated
over the period 1979Q1-1999Q1 comprising a total of 25 countries which are grouped into 11 regions
(shown in bold in Table 1). These countries comprise around 80% of world output (in 1999). The
advantage of the GVAR is that it allows for a true multi-country setting; however it can become
computationally demanding very quickly. For that reason the seven key economies of the U.S.,
Japan, China, Germany, U.K., France and Italy are modeled as regions of their own while the other
18 countries are grouped into four regions.22
Table 1
Countries/Regions in the GVAR Model
U.S.A. Germany Japan China
U.K. Italy France
Western Europe South East Asia Latin America Middle East
·Spain ·Korea ·Argentina ·Kuwait
·Belgium ·Thailand ·Brazil ·Saudi Arabia




In contrast to existing modeling approaches, in the GVAR the use of cointegration is not conﬁned
to a single country or region. By estimating a cointegrating model for each country/region sepa-
rately, the model also allows for endowment and institutional heterogeneitiest h a te x i s ta c r o s st h e
22See PSW, Section 8, for details on cross-country aggregation into regions.
14diﬀerent countries. Accordingly, speciﬁc vector error-correcting models (VECM) are estimated for
individual countries (or regions) by relating domestic macroeconomic variables such as GDP, inﬂa-
tion, equity prices, money supply, exchange rates and interest rates to corresponding, and therefore
country-speciﬁc, foreign variables constructed exclusively to match the international trade pattern
of the country/region under consideration.23 By making use of speciﬁc exogeneity assumptions
regarding the ‘rest of the world’ with respect to a given domestic or regional economy, the GVAR
makes eﬃcient use of limited amounts of data and presents a consistently estimated global model.
The GVAR allows for interactions to take place between factors and economies through three
distinct but interrelated channels:
• Contemporaneous dependence of domestic on foreign variables and their lagged values;
• Dependence of country speciﬁc variables on observed common global eﬀects such as oil prices;
• Weak cross-sectional dependence of the idiosyncratic shocks.
The individual models are estimated allowing for unit roots and cointegration assuming that
region-speciﬁc foreign variables are weakly exogenous, with the exception of the model for the U.S.
economy which is treated as a closed economy model. The U.S. model is linked to the outside world
through exchange rates, which in turn are themselves determined by the rest of the region-speciﬁc
models. PSW show that the careful construction of the global variables as weighted averages of the
other regional variables leads to a simultaneous system of regional equations that may be solved
to form a global system. They also provide theoretical arguments as well as empirical evidence in
support of the weak exogeneity assumption that allows the region-speciﬁc models to be estimated
consistently.
For policy analysis, one would like to be able to examine how shocking a given macroeconomic
variable aﬀects all other macroeconomic variables in the global economy. For example, it might be
of interest to determine the eﬀects of a contemporaneous 10% drop in the Japanese equity prices
on other macroeconomic variables, and the eﬀects that these have on the credit risk of a given
portfolio. Impulse response functions provide us with the tools to carry out this type of analysis.
Technical details on the derivation of generalized impulse response functions within the GVAR
model are provided in Section C of a Supplement that is available from the authors on request.
The conditional loss distribution of a given credit portfolio can now be derived by linking
up the return processes of individual ﬁrms, initially presented in equation (14), explicitly to the
macro and global variables in the GVAR model. In this way we are able to generate multi-period
loss distributions conditional on a baseline macroeconomic forecast as well as loss distributions
conditional on macroeconomic shocks.
23Theoretical underpinnings of such country-speciﬁc models are provided in Garratt et al. (2003a).
153.2 Return Regressions: A Heterogeneous Formulation
Firm returns in a multi-factor context are often modeled as a function of macro variables that are
speciﬁct ot h eﬁrm’s domicile country plus global variables such as changes in oil prices. But such
as p e c i ﬁcation leaves out one of the key features of the GVAR model, namely the foreign-speciﬁc
variables which could be particularly important in the case of large international corporations.
Here we extend the ﬁrm return model by incorporating all GVAR factors to take full advantage
of the GVAR dynamics. Accordingly, a ﬁrm’s change in value (or return) is assumed to be a
function of contemporaneous changes in the underlying macroeconomic factors (the systematic
component), say ki region-speciﬁcd o m e s t i ca n dk∗
i foreign macroeconomic variables, the exogenous
global variables dt (in our application oil prices) and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc idiosyncratic shocks ηji,t+1:




ji∆dt+1 + ηji,t+1, (19)
for j =1 ,2,...,nc i, i =0 ,1,..,N, where xi,t+1, x∗
i,t+1, and dt+1 are the ki × 1,k ∗
i × 1, and s × 1
vectors of macroeconomic and global factors, nci is the number of ﬁrms in region i,a n dN +1is
the total number of regions, with the U.S. economy being designated as region 0. The endogenous
variables for each region, xi,t+1, typically include real output, inﬂation, interest rate, real equity
prices, exchange rate, and real money balances. The foreign variables x∗
it are tailored to be region-
speciﬁc. The GVAR assumes that each macroeconomic variable in the vector x∗
it is a weighted
average of the corresponding macroeconomic variables of all other regions outside region i.T a k i n g





wi y t, with
N X
 =0
wi  =1and w   =0 ,
where y∗
it is the log of the output of the rest of the world from the perspective of country/region
i, y t is the log of the output of region  ,a n dwi  is the weight attached to region  ’s output in
construction of the rest of the world output as seen by region i. Weights for the construction of the
region-speciﬁc global variables are based on the trade share of region l in the total trade volume
of region i, although for variables such as equity and interest rates they could be based on capital
ﬂows instead.
The GVAR speciﬁes the following augmented vector autoregressive form:
xit = ai0 + ai1t + Φixi,t−1 + Λi0x∗
it + Λi1x∗
i,t−1 + Ψi0dt + Ψi1dt−1 + εit, (20)
t =1 ,2,...,T; i =0 ,1,2,...,N,
where xit is the ki × 1 country-speciﬁc factors/variables, ai1 is a ki × 1 vector of linear trend
coeﬃcients, Φi is a ki×ki matrix of associated lagged coeﬃcients, x∗
it is the k∗
i ×1 vector of foreign
variables speciﬁct oc o u n t r yi with Λi0 and Λi1 being ki × k∗
i matrices of ﬁxed coeﬃcients, dt is
16an s × 1 vector of common global variables assumed to be exogenous to the global economy with
Ψi0 and Ψi1 being ki ×s matrices of ﬁxed coeﬃcients, and εit is a ki ×1 vector of country-speciﬁc
shocks assumed to be serially uncorrelated with a zero mean and a non-singular covariance matrix,
Σii =( σii, s),w h e r eσii, s = cov(εi t,ε ist), or written more compactly
εit v i.i.d.(0,Σii).
Although the model is estimated on a regional basis, we allow for the shocks to be correlated across






= Σij for t = t0,
= 0 for t 6= t.
The model is speciﬁed with one lag, although multi-lag extensions are possible.24 While we present
the model in more detail in the Supplement, note that the set of regional equations can be combined




0 which is the global k×1 vector, where k =
PN
i=0 ki
is the total number of the endogenous variables in the global model, in our case 63:
xt = b0 + b1t + zxt−1 + Υ0dt + Υ1dt−1 + ut, (21)
where b0 and b1 are k × 1 vectors of coeﬃcients, z is a k × k matrix of coeﬃcients, dt is an s × 1
vector of common global variables assumed to be exogenous to the global economy (here to be the
oil price) with corresponding k×s matrices of coeﬃcients, Υ0 and Υ1. Finally, ut is a k×1 vectors
of (reduced form) shocks that are linear functions of the region-speciﬁcs h o c k s( εit).








where the weight matrix Wi serves as the ‘link’ between the endogenous vector of variables in
the world economy, x0
t+1 and the domestic (xi,t+1)a n df o r e i g n( x∗
i,t+1)v a r i a b l e sf o rr e g i o ni.T h e
non-zero elements of Wi are given by trade weights of country i relative to all other countries in
the GVAR model. Hence we have
rji,t+1 = αji + B0
jiWi∆xt+1 + γ0






¢0 . The GVAR model provides forecasts of all the global variables, xt+1,
that directly or indirectly aﬀect the returns, rji,t+1. If the model captures all systematic risk, the
idiosyncratic risk components of any two companies in the model would be uncorrelated, namely
24Recently, Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran and Smith (2004) have extended the GVAR to more countries (33) and a
longer sample length (1979Q1-2003Q4) and proceed to estimate country-speciﬁcm o d e l sw i t hd i ﬀerent lag lengths
which are then aggregated to a global model along the lines outlined in PSW.
17the idiosyncratic risks, ηji,t+1, ought to be cross-sectionally uncorrelated. The values of the global
exogenous variables, dt+1, could either be ﬁxed to represent particular scenarios of interest, such
as high or low oil prices, or could be forecast using a sub-model for oil prices (possibly with
macroeconomic feedbacks).
Under this speciﬁcation, due to the contemporaneous dependence of ∆xt+1 on ∆dt+1, we re-
write (22) as
rji,t+1 = αji + Γ0













¢0 collects all the
observable macroeconomic variables plus oil prices in the global model (totaling 64 in PSW). To
be sure, these return regressions are not prediction equations per se as they depend on contempo-
raneous variables. However, using results provided in a Supplement (available on request), we can
write
rji,t+1 = αji + Γ0
ji(µ + δ)−Γ0
ji(I − Φ)(yt − γ t)+Γ0
jiDυt+1 + ηji,t+1, (24)
which decomposes the individual asset returns into a predictable component, Γ0
ji(I − Φ)(yt − γ t),
and an unpredictable component, Γ0
jiDυt+1 + ηji,t+1. This term comprises eﬀects due to common
macroeconomic shocks, Γ0
jiDυt+1,w h e r eD is a (k + s) × (k + s) matrix of ﬁxed coeﬃcients from
the GVAR model, υt+1 =( ε0
t+1,ε d,t+1)0 collects the set of all macroeconomic innovations, εt+1,a n d
the global exogenous factor innovation, εd,t+1 (in our model the oil price innovation). The ﬁrm-
speciﬁc idiosyncractic innovations, ηji,t+1, are assumed to be distributed independently of υt+1.
The remaining terms are ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, αji, and the drift components of the macro
factors and the global exogenous variables, Γ0
ji(µ + δ).
The predictable component is likely to be weak and will depend on the size of the factor
loadings, Γji, and the extent to which the underlying global variables are cointegrating. In the
absence of any cointegrating relations in the global model, Φ = I and none of the asset returns
are predictable. As it happens the econometric evidence presented in PSW strongly supports
the existence of 36 cointegrating relations in the global model and is, therefore, compatible with
some degree of predictability in asset returns. The extent to which asset returns are predicted could
reﬂect time-varying risk premia and does not necessarily imply market ineﬃciencies. Our modelling
approach provides an operational procedure for relating excess returns of individual ﬁrms to all the
observable macro factors in the global economy.
3.3 Expected Loss Due to Default
Given the value change process for ﬁrm j,d e ﬁned by (19), and the log threshold-equity ratio,
ˆ λR(t,H), obtainable from an initial credit rating (see Section 2.1), we now consider the conditions
under which the ﬁrm defaults. Speciﬁcally, we need to deﬁne the expected loss to ﬁrm j at time T
given information available to the lender (e.g. a bank) at time T, w h i c hw ea s s u m ei sg i v e nb yΩT.
18Following (18), default occurs when the ﬁrm’s value (return) falls below the log-threshold-equity




rji,T+1 < ˆ λR(T,1) | ΩT
´





rji,T+1 < ˆ λR(T,1) | ΩT
´i
× ˜ L,
where Xji,T+1 is the maximum loss exposure assuming no recoveries (typically the face value of
t h el o a n )a n di sk n o w na tt i m eT, Sji,T+1 is the percentage of exposure which cannot be recovered
in the event of default (sometimes called loss given default or severity),25 and ˜ L is some future
value of loss in the event of non-default at T +1(which we set to zero for simplicity).26 Typically
Sji,T+1 is not known at time of default and will be treated as a random variable over the range
[0,1]. In the empirical application we make the typical assumption that Sji,T+1 are draws from a
beta distribution with given mean and variance calibrated to (pooled) historical data on default
severity.27
Substituting (22) into (25) and setting ˜ L to zero we now obtain:





ji∆yT+1 + ηji,T+1 < ˆ λR(T,1) | ΩT
´
,
is the conditional default probability over the period T to T +1 ,f o r m e da tt i m eT. Our modeling
framework allows us to derive an explicit expression for πji,T+1|T.
Using ﬁrm returns as characterized by (24), and after some simpliﬁcations, we have
πji,T+1|T =P r
³




ξji,T+1 = ηji,T+1 + Γ0
jiDυT+1, (28)
and
µji,T+1|T = αji + Γ0
ji[µ+(T +1 ) δ] − Γ0
ji(I − Φ)yT. (29)
These results decompose the return for ﬁrm j into its explained (29) and unexplained (28) com-
ponents, itself containing the idiosyncracratic innovation ηji,T+1 and the systematic innovations
25One would expect loss severity to be higher in recessions than expansions (see Frye (2000) and Altman et al.
(2002)). Defaults are pro-cyclical, ﬂooding the market with distressed assets which drive down their price (or increasing
severity). However, for simplicity we follow the standard assumption that exposure and severity are independently
distributed.
26It is common practice in the industry to set h L to zero.
27The beta distribution is usually chosen since it is bounded, such as on the unit interval, with two shape parameters
which can be expressed in terms of mean and standard deviation of losses.
19collected in υT+1 =( ε0
T+1,ε d,T+1)0. Note that although the ﬁrm in question operates in coun-
try/region i, its probability of default could be aﬀected by macroeconomic shocks worldwide.
Under the assumption that all these shocks or innovations are jointly normally distributed and
the parameter estimates are given, we have the following expression for the probability of default




















B = DΣυD0 is given by (A.18) in the Supplement, Συ is the variance-covariance matrix of the
composite systematic innovations υt,a n dω2
η,ji is the variance of ﬁrm’s idiosyncractic shock, ηji,T+1.
Both of the restrictions (given parameter values and joint normality) can be relaxed. Parameter
uncertainty can be taken into account by integrating out the true parameters using posterior or
predictive likelihoods of the unknown parameters, as in Garratt et al. (2003b). In the presence of
non-normal shocks one could simulate the loss distributions assuming fat-tailed distributions such
as Student t with a suﬃciently low degree of freedom. Alternatively, one can employ non-parametric
stochastic simulation techniques by re-sampling from estimated residuals of the GVAR model to
estimate πji,T+1|T.
The expected loss due to default of a loan (credit) portfolio can now be computed by aggregating
the expected losses across the diﬀerent loans. Denoting the loss of a loan portfolio over the period






πji,T+1|T ET(Xji,T+1) ET(Sji,T+1), (32)
where nci is the number of obligors (which could be zero) in the bank’s loan portfolio resident in
country/region i.
3.4 Simulation of the Loss Distribution
The expected loss as well as the entire loss distribution can be simulated for the period T to T +1
once the GVAR model parameters, the return process parameters in (22) and the thresholds in
(11) have been estimated for a sample of observations t =1 ,2,...,T. The key component of the
simulations are ﬁrm-speciﬁc returns deﬁn e db y( 2 4 ) ,w h i c hw ew r i t ea s
rji,T+1 = µji,T+1|T + Γ0
jiDυT+1 + ηji,T+1, (33)
28Joint normality is suﬃcient but not necessary for ξji,t+1 to be approximately normally distributed. This is
because ξji,t+1 is a linear function of a large number of weakly correlated shocks (63 in our particular application).
20where the predictable component, µji,T+1|T, is given by (29), and the innovations, υT+1 and ηji,T+1,
are distributed independently with zero means and the variances Συ and ω2
η,ji, respectively. In gen-
eral, ﬁrm-speciﬁc returns can be simulated under alternative assumptions regarding the probability
distribution of the innovations. However, simulations become particularly simple to implement
under Gaussian innovations.29 In this case, Γ0





and ﬁrm-speciﬁc returns can be obtained as
r
(r)





ji,T+1denotes the rth replication of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc returns, and ξ
(r)
ji,T+1 is the rth replication
















ji are independent draws from N(0,1).
The loss can then be simulated in period T +1using (known) loan face values, say FVji,T,a s


























and as R →∞then ¯ LR,T+1
p
→ ET (LT+1), The simulated loss distribution is given by ordered
values of L
(r)
T+1, for r =1 ,2,...,R. For a desired percentile, for example the 99%, and a given
number of replications, say R =1 0 ,000, credit value at risk is given as the 100th highest loss.
3.5 Default and Expected Loss Given Economic Shocks
I nc r e d i tr i s ka n a l y s i sw em a ya l s ob ei n t e r e s t e di ne valuating quantitatively the relative importance
of changes in diﬀerent macroeconomic variables or factors on the loss distribution. In the argot
of risk management this is sometimes called scenario analysis. To this end the loss distribution
conditional on a given shock can be compared to a baseline distribution without such a shock.
It is diﬃcult to imagine conducting such counterfactuals using a credit risk model that relies on
accounting data.
As with all counterfactual experiments it is important that the eﬀects of the shock on other
macroeconomic variables are clearly speciﬁed. One possibility would be to assume that the other
29The simplifying procedure is also applicable when υT+1 has a standard multivariate Student-t distribution.
21variables are displaced according to their historical covariances with the variable being shocked.
This is in line with the generalized impulse response function (GIRF) analysis discussed in Section
C of the Supplement. In this set-up, if variable   in country i is shocked by one standard error (i.e.






where si  is a (k + s) × 1 selection vector with its element corresponding to the  th variable in
country i being unity and zeros elsewhere.
The above counterfactual, while of some interest, will underestimate the expected loss under
both shock scenarios since it abstracts from volatility of the macroeconomic factors. To allow for
volatility of macroeconomic factors in the analysis consider the case where the various shocks are
jointly normally distributed, and note that
rji,T+1 = µji,T+1|T + Γ0
jiDυT+1 + ηji,T+1,
where µji,T+1|T is deﬁned by (29). Following a similar line of argument as in PSW (see also the
Supplement, Section C), if the shock is assumed to be anticipated we have
rji,T+1
¯ ¯ΩT,ε iT+1,  =
√







where εi,T+1,  = s0
i υT+1, ψi (∆y,1) is deﬁned by (38) and30
ω2
ξ,ji,i  = ω2
η,ji + Γ0
jiBi Γji, (39)
where Γji are the factor loadings and Bi  is given by equation (A.29) in the Supplement. But if the
shock is unanticipated (which we consider to be more relevant for credit risk analysis) we have
rji,T+1
¯ ¯ΩT,ε iT+1,  =
√








ξ,ji is given by (31).
Therefore, to allow for volatility of the innovations (macroeconomic as well as idiosyncratic),
the simulation of the loss distribution needs to be carried out using the draws
r
il,(r)
ji,T+1 = µji,T+1|T + Γ0





ji,T+1 is deﬁned by (35).
In the case of our empirical application where the log of oil prices is the only global variable in
the model, the eﬀect of a unit unanticipated shock to oil prices, Po






















o is the variance of oil price shock, εot, so is a (k+1)×1 selection vector of zeros except for its last
element which is set equal to unity, such that s0
oυt = εot,a n dΥ0 collects the coeﬃcients for the










simplifying the oil shock-conditional ﬁrst period return to
r
o,(r)
ji,T+1 = µji,T+1|T + σoθji,o + ξ
(r)
ji,T+1. (41)
This expression clearly shows that, relative to the baseline, the mean is increased by σoθji,o.
Default occurs if the rth simulated return falls below the threshold-equity ratio ˆ λR(T,1) deﬁned
by (9), so that for all three cases,
Baseline (34) r
(r)
ji,T+1 < ˆ λR(T,1) =⇒ Default, (42)
Macro-shock-Conditional (40) r
il,(r)
ji,T+1 < ˆ λR(T,1) =⇒ Default,
Oil—shock-Conditional (41) r
o,(r)
ji,T+1 < ˆ λR(T,1) =⇒ Default.
Using these results in (36), the loss distribution can be simulated for any desired level of accuracy
by selecting R, the number of replications, to be suﬃciently large.
Finally, it might also be of interest to compare the base line default probability, πji,T+1|T,g i v e n
by (30) with the default probability that results under the (unanticipated) shock to xi,T+1, ,w h i c h
we denote by πi 
ji,T+1|T.W eh a v e
πji,T+1|T = Φ
Ã













3.6 Simulation of Multi-Step Ahead Loss Distributions
The forecast horizon for computing losses is constrained by the horizon used by the rating agencies
(typically one year) when assessing a ﬁrm.32 We take this to be about one year, but certainly
not less, commensurate with a one year ahead default probability. We begin by considering the
31More details can be found in Section A of the Supplement.
32Going beyond this horizon would involve updating forward credit ratings, a topic of current research by the
authors.
23default conditions two periods (quarters) forward. The Merton model considers default only at the
terminal date. Viewed at period T, ﬁrm j will default if
rji,T+1 + rji,T+2 < 2ˆ µR +ˆ σR
√
2 ˆ QR(2),





rji,T+τ <Hˆ µR +ˆ σR
√
H ˆ QR(H), (44)
where Rji,T+H denotes the cumulative H-period return. The ﬁrm’s default probability can now be
computed by simulating from the joint probability distribution function of future returns rji,T+1,...,
rji,T+H, conditional on ΩT. For details see Section B in the Supplement.
3.6.1 Baseline Multi-period Loss Distribution
Of course in our set-up ﬁrm returns are serially correlated through their systematic risk factor
dependence (the GVAR), and so the loss distribution due to default by ﬁrm j in region i over the
period T to T + H c a nn o wb ew r i t t e na s 33
Lji(T +1 ,T+ H)=Lji,T+1 + ϕI
³









Rji,T+κ ≥ ˆ λR(T,κ)
´#
Lji,T+H, (45)
where ϕ is a discount factor (0 ≤ ϕ<1, which could be set as ϕ =1 /(1 + ρ) with ρ being an
average real rate of interest), Rji,T+κ is deﬁned by (44), and
Lji,T+κ = I
³
Rji,T+κ < ˆ λR(T,κ)
´
Xji,T+κ Sji,T+κ,f o rκ =1 ,2,...,H.
The multi-period loss expression (45) can be thought of as a survival function which progressively
computes loss in period T +τ +1only if the ﬁrm has survived the previous period T +τ.Using this
architecture the multi-period baseline loss distribution can be simulated using the draws r
(r)
ji,T+τ,
for τ =1 ,2,..,H and r =1 ,2,...,R (see below and (A.22) in the Supplement), and the empirical
distribution of Lji(T +1 ,T+ H) can be constructed from L
(r)
ji (T +1 ,T+ H) where
L
(r)





























ji,T+κ, for κ =1 ,2,...,H.
33Once again, we assume for simplicity that losses L past the horizon, H, are zero.
24Aggregating across ﬁrms, we ﬁnally obtain the time T conditional H- s t e pa h e a ds i m u l a t e dl o s s
distribution of the credit portfolio:







ji (T +1 ,T+ H), r =1 ,2,...,R.
3.6.2 Multi-period Loss Distribution Given Economic Shocks
Consider now the eﬀect of a one standard error shock to factor   in country i on the multi-period
loss distribution. Using the results in the Supplement, Section C on impulse responses we have
r
i ,(r)
ji,T+κ = µji,T+κ|T + Γ0
jiψi (∆y,κ)+ξ
(r)
ji,T+κ, for κ =1 ,2,...,H, (46)




























τ + ωη,ji Z
(r)
jiκ , (47)




jiκ are independent draws from N(0,1) for all τ, j,i and κ.




ji,T+κ = µji,T+κ|T + ξ
(r)
ji,T+κ,
for κ =1 ,2,...,H.
4 Credit Loss Results
4.1 Risk, Return and Default by Credit Rating
In order to obtain estimates of the rating-speciﬁc default threshold ratios, we make use of the
rating histories from Standard and Poors spanning 1981-1999, roughly the same sample period as
is covered by the GVAR model. We use S&P ratings since they are designed to capture default
probability, whereas Moody’s also incorporates an expectation of recovery into their ratings (Cantor
and Packer 1995, BIS 2000, particularly its Annex I.B). The estimates of the one- through four-
quarter ahead threshold-equity ratio, CR,t+H/ERt, are computed using exp(ˆ λR(H)) with H =
1,..,4,w h e r eˆ λR(H) is deﬁned by (11). Empirical default probabilities, ˆ πR(t,H), are obtained
using default intensity-based estimates detailed in Lando and Skødeberg (2002). The transition
intensity approach uses techniques from survival analysis which make eﬃcient use of ratings histories
25to obtain transition probabilities. This becomes especially important for the estimation of the
transition from rating R to default. No default event may have occurred within a particular
quarter; that does not, however, necessarily mean that ˆ πR(t,H)=0 .I t s u ﬃces that an obligor
migrated from, say, AAA to AA to A, and that a default occurred from A to contribute probability
mass to πAAA; see also Jafry and Schuermann (2004). Still, there may be instances when there is
no movement at all during a particular quarter. In that case the estimated default intensity (and
hence probability) would indeed be identically equal to zero.
For each quarter and each rating-specifc default probability, ˆ πR(t,H), we compute the inverse
CDF to obtain a time series of rating speciﬁc thresholds.34 Since S&P rates only a subset of ﬁrms
(in 1981 S&P rated 1,378 ﬁrms of which about 98% were U.S. domiciled; by early 1999 this had
risen to 4,910, about 68% U.S.), it is reasonable to assign a non-zero (albeit very small) probability
of default, even if the empirical estimate is zero.35 This is particularly relevant if we wish to infer
default behavior for a much broader set of ﬁrms than is covered by the rating agencies. With this
in mind, we impose a lower bound on the quarterly ˆ πR set at 0.025 basis points per quarter.
Rating speciﬁc average returns, ˆ µR, and their volatility, ˆ σR, are computed using the cum
dividend total return measure from CRSP for all U.S. ﬁrms with a credit rating in a given quarter
over the sample range 1981Q1 to 1999Q1. The results for H =1a r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e2b e l o w
for the range of ratings that are represented in our portfolio of ﬁrms, namely AAA to B; similar
results are obtained for H =2 ,3 and 4.
Table 2
Rating-Speciﬁc Return and Equity-Threshold Estimation
Credit Rating ˆ µR ˆ σR ˆ µR/ˆ σR ˆ πR(t,1) (in bp) \ CR,1/ER #o fo b s . 36
AAA 4.54% 13.87% 0.33 0.026 0.56 1,177
AA 4.06% 15.16% 0.27 0.369 0.52 6,272
A 4.13% 15.31% 0.27 0.714 0.52 12,841
BBB 3.80% 17.38% 0.22 10.63 0.50 9,499
BB 3.21% 24.72% 0.13 49.21 0.42 7,002
B 2.04% 34.82% 0.06 351.66 0.40 6,493
\ CR,1/ERdenotes the sample estimate of the one-quarter ahead default equity ratio,
ˆ µR and ˆ σRare the sample estimates of the quarterly mean and standard deviations of R-rated ﬁrms
ˆ πR(t,1) is the quarterly default probability (in basis points) for R-rated ﬁrms
34While (9) and (10) are written in terms of a standard normal distribution, other distributions such as the Student
t can also be used.
35Ratings and rating histories are from Standard and Poor’s CreditPro Database V. 6.2. We use the sample period
1981Q1-1999Q1.
26We note that average quarterly volatility, ˆ σR, increases monotonically as we descend the rating
spectrum to the point where the volatility of a B-rated ﬁrm is more than twice than that of an AA-
rated ﬁrm. Average returns do not keep pace with the increasing volatility, resulting in similarly
declining Sharpe ratios (ˆ µR/ˆ σR). Quarterly default probabilities display the familiar pattern of
increasing dramatically as we descend the credit spectrum, especially once the investment grade
boundary is crossed (i.e. BB and below).
The counter-intuitive pattern of declining expected returns is in line with Dichev (1998) who
ﬁnds that bankruptcy risk measured by credit ratings is not rewarded by higher returns. On
the contrary, his analysis suggests that since 1980 ﬁrms with higher bankruptcy risk earn lower
than average returns. Vassalou and Xing (2004) argue that rating data might reﬂect deteriorating
ﬁnancial conditions of a company with too much delay. Using the Merton default model to compute
a default likelihood indicator, they ﬁnd that high default stocks earn signiﬁcantly higher returns
than low default stocks, but only if they are small or have a high book-to-market value. To be
sure, ˆ µR plays at best a secondary role in determining the default threshold ˆ λR which is driven
primarily by ˆ σR and ˆ πR.
Of particular interest is the behavior of the one-quarter forward threshold-equity ratio \ CR,1/ER
which exhibits relatively little variation across ratings. It ranges from 0.56 for AAA to 0.40 for
B. When we extended the sample to the maximum sample length available, 1981Q1 - 2002Q4, the
means, standard deviations and forward threshold-equity ratios remained quite stable. Only the
default probabilities exhibited noticeable variation when extending the sample. These probability
values are very small (they are reported in basis points!) simply because there are so few defaults
for the very high credit grades. Moreover, the years 2001 and 2002 saw record default levels in the
corporate bond markets (S&P 2003).
To understand the role of the threshold-equity ratio, take for example a ﬁrm rated BBB and
its threshold-equity ratio of 0.50. If this ﬁrm has an equity level of 100 today, it would be able
to sustain a drop to 0.50 × 100 = 50 over one quarter before defaulting on its debt obligations.
The likelihood of this event is driven largely by ˆ σBBB which is 17.38%. By contrast, a ﬁrm rated
B would be able to sustain a drop to 0.40 × 100 = 40, but the likelihood of this event, driven by
ˆ σB =3 4 .82%, is of course much higher than for the BBB-rated ﬁrm.
4.2 The Sample Portfolio
We analyze the eﬀects of economic shocks on a ﬁctitious large-corporate loan portfolio which is
summarized in Table 3. It contains a total of 119 companies, resident over 10 of the 11 regions. In
order for a ﬁrm to enter our sample, several criteria had to be met. We restricted ourselves to major,
publicly traded ﬁrms which had a credit rating from either Moody’s or S&P. Thus, for example,
Chinese companies are not included for lack of a credit rating. The ﬁrms should be represented
27within the major equity index for that country. We favored ﬁr m sf o rw h i c he q u i t yr e t u r nd a t aw a s
available for the entire sample period, i.e. going back to 1979. Typically this would exclude large
ﬁrms such as telephone operators which in many instances have only been privatized recently, even
though they might now represent a signiﬁcant share in their country’s dominant equity index. The
data source is Datastream, and we took their Total Return Index variable which is a cum dividend
return measure.
The third column in Table 3 indicates the sample range of the equity series available for return
regression analysis. We wanted to mimic (broadly) the portfolio of a large, internationally active
bank. Arbitrarily picking Germany as the bank’s domicile country, the portfolio is relatively more
exposed to German ﬁrms than would be the case if exposure were allocated purely on a GDP share
(in our “world” of 25 countries). For the remaining regions, exposure is more in line with GDP
share. Within a region, loan exposure is randomly assigned. The expected severity for loans to
U.S. companies is the lowest at 20%, based upon studies by Citibank, Fitch Investor Service and
Moody’s Investor Service.37 All other severities are based on assumptions, reﬂecting the idea that
severities are higher in less developed countries. Table 3 gives the portfolio composition, regional
weights, individual exposures, expected (µβ) and unexpected (σβ) severities, as well as average
pair-wise quarterly return correlations.38 We see substantial variation in those correlations across
the diﬀerent countries and regions, ranging from 53% in Germany to 19% in the U.K. and Western
Europe. The overall average pair-wise correlation across the whole portfolio is a relatively low 15%
owing to the high degree of geographic diversiﬁcation.
37As cited in Saunders and Allen (2002).
38Mean severity is assumed to be slightly lower in Germany (as compared to France or U.K., for example), since
Germany is assumed to be the bank’s domicile country and hence the bank may have some local advantages in the
recovery of distress assets. Unexpected severity refers to standard deviation of severity distribution assumed here to
be Beta distributed.
28Table 3
The Composition of the Sample Portfolio for Regions
Equity Series1 Credit Rating2 Exposure Severity3 Avg. Return
Region # Firms Quarterly Range Per cent Mean S.D. Correlation4
(µβ)( σβ)
U.S. 14 79Q1 - 99Q1 AAA to BBB− 20 20% 10% 0.26
U.K. 9 79Q1 - 99Q1 AA to BBB+ 6 35% 15% 0.19
Germany 18 79Q1 - 99Q1 AAA to BBB− 21 30% 15% 0.53
France 8 79Q1 - 99Q1 AA to BBB 8 35% 15% 0.24
Italy 6 79Q1 - 99Q1 A to BBB− 8 35% 15% 0.31
W. Europe 12 79Q1 - 99Q1 AAA to BBB+ 8 35% 15% 0.19
Middle East 4 90Q3 - 99Q1 B− 2 60% 20% 0.38
S.E. Asia 23 89Q3 - 99Q1 A to B 10 50% 20% 0.27
Japan 13 79Q1 - 99Q1 AAA to B+ 10 35% 15% 0.32
L. America 12 89Q3 - 99Q1 A to B− 5 65% 20% 0.23
Total 119 - - 100 - - 0.15
1. Equity prices of companies in emerging markets are not available over the full sample period used for the estimation
horizon of the GVAR. We have a complete series for all ﬁrms only for the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan. For
France, Italy and W. Europe, although some of the series go back through 1979Q1, data was available for all ﬁrms
from 1987Q4 (France), 1987Q4 (Italy), 1989Q3 (W. Europe). We used that sample range for the multi-factor regressions
for those regions. For L. America we have a complete sample range for all ﬁrms from 1990Q2.
2. The sample contains a mix of Moody’s and S&P ratings, although S&P rating nomenclature is used for convenience.
3. Severity is drawn from a beta distribution with mean µβ a n ds t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o nσβ.
4. Arithmetic average of quarterly pair-wise correlations of ﬁrm returns.
The average credit quality, as measured by exposure weighted credit rating, is somewhat higher
(better) than the average commercial and industrial (C&I) lending portfolio for large, U.S. banks.
Treacy and Carey (2000) report that on average about half of those portfolios are of investment
grade quality, meaning having a rating of BBB− or better, whereas the proportion meeting this
threshold is about 80% in our portfolio. We would therefore expect losses in our portfolio to be
lower, on average, than losses in a typical C&I portfolio for a U.S. bank.
294.3 Return Regressions
4.3.1 Variable Selection Process
The general form of the multi-factor return equations used in this study is given by (19), which
links individual ﬁrm returns to observed domestic and global macroeconomic risk factors, and can
be estimated by least squares under the assumption that the ﬁrm-speciﬁcs h o c k s ,ηijt,a n dt h es e to f
macro shocks, υt, are uncorrelated. However, since there is likely to be a high degree of correlation
between some of the domestic and foreign variables (e.g. real equity prices and interest rates),
a more parsimonious version might be desirable for empirical analysis. To this end two possible
approaches can be followed. A standard procedure would be to apply regressor selection methods
to each of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc regressions separately. Since we have 119 ﬁrms in our portfolio with as
many as 13 estimated coeﬃcients each,39 the application of such a procedure, besides being very
time-consuming, can be subject to a considerable degree of speciﬁcation searches with undesirable
consequences. Alternatively, we could view the 119 return regressions as forming a panel with
heterogeneous slope coeﬃcients and base the regressor selection procedure on the means of the
estimated coeﬃcients, referred to as the mean group estimators (MGE).40 This approach is clearly
more manageable and will be adopted in this study.
Initially, we estimated multi-factor regressions including all the domestic and foreign variables
relevant to the ﬁrm’s domicile region. The variables are output (∆y,∆y∗),i n ﬂation (∆2p,∆2p∗),
equity price (∆q,∆q∗),r e a le x c h a n g er a t e s(∆(e−p),∆(e−p)∗), interest rates (∆r,∆r∗),a n dr e a l
money balances (∆m,∆m∗). An asterisk denotes foreign variables. The return equations estimated
for the U.S. ﬁrms are somewhat diﬀerent in that the only foreign regressor included is the foreign
real exchange rate (∆(e − p)∗), but the domestic exchange rate variable is excluded as the U.S.
dollar is the numeraire currency. For the non-U.S. regressions, we apply the MGE procedure to
remove insigniﬁcant variables. Because of the limited number of U.S. ﬁrms, we rely on t-statistics
and the signs of individual coeﬃcients to choose the best subset of regressors. Finally, recognizing
the likely collinearity of ∆q and ∆q∗ (the domestic and foreign equity series), we run two versions
of each model, one with domestic equity and one with foreign. We choose the model with the higher
adjusted R-squared, ¯ R2.41,42
39One constant, six domestic, ﬁve foreign macroeconomic variables plus oil prices.
40For further details of the MGE procedure see Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran, Smith and Im (1996).
41Since the two non-nested multi-factor regressions have the same number of coeﬃcients, the same result would
follow if other model selection criteria are used.
42Of course, there are other approaches to choosing an multi-factor speciﬁcation for each ﬁrm. We considered (and,
in fact, carried out) alternative approaches, including one which began with only domestic variables (plus oil) in the
multi-factor regressions, slimming down via MGE, and then potential substitution of foreign for domestic variables if
the signiﬁcance or sign of the domestic variable was called into question. In the end, we felt that taking an approach
that was more consistent with the framework of the GVAR model (i.e. beginning with all of the GVAR models and
then paring the model down) was more appropriate.
304 . 3 . 2 R e t u r nR e g r e s s i o nR e s u l t s
A summary result of the initial multi-factor regressions are provided in Table 4, where the pro-
portion of ﬁrms with signiﬁcant multi-factor regressions (using an F-test at the 5% level) and
signiﬁcant t-ratios for individual factors are given across diﬀerent countries/regions. Around 90%
of the return regressions were signiﬁcant (using the F-test) at the 5% level. The F-test values in the
ﬁrst row of Table 4 suggest that changes in the macroeconomic factors have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on equity returns. The t-statistics for the coeﬃcients of individual macroeconomic factors clearly
single out two important ones: the domestic and foreign real equity returns.43 For regions where no
full equity series could be incorporated in the GVAR, i.e. the Middle East, we cannot identify one
dominant macroeconomic factor. In South East Asia, both domestic and foreign output matter, as
does the exchange rate. Oil price changes are signiﬁcant in about a quarter of the regressions.
Table 4
Results from Firm Multi-Factor Regressions: % of ﬁrms signiﬁcant at 5% level44
W. Mid S. E. Latin
U.S.A. U.K. Germany France Italy Europe East Asia Japan America
F-test 93% 100% 94% 88% 67% 100% 75% 65% 92% 25%
const.45 21% 44% 6% 25% 33% 8% 25% 30% 15% 17%
∆y 14% 11% 0% 13% 0% 0% 0% 35% 8% 8%
∆2p 21% 11% 0% 13% 0% 0% 25% 13% 0% 8%
∆q 93% 44% 11% 38% 83% 92% — 74% 85% 25%
∆(e − p) — 11% 0% 0% 0% 17% 25% 35% 38% 25%
∆r 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 8% 50% 4% 0% 0%
∆m 14% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 25% 13% 0% 17%
∆y∗ — 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% 0% 35% 8% 8%
∆2p∗ — 11% 0% 13% 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17%
∆q∗ — 56% 100% 63% 33% 50% 25% 17% 15% 8%
∆(e − p)∗ 7% — — — — — — — — —
∆r∗ — 22% 0% 13% 33% 0% 25% 0% 0% 17%
∆m∗ — 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% 17% 0% 0%
∆po 21% 22% 33% 38% 17% 8% 50% 17% 0% 25%
avg. R2 0.30 0.34 0.38 0.43 0.49 0.51 0.48 0.47 0.40 0.39
avg. ¯ R2 0.23 0.22 0.27 0.31 0.37 0.41 0.26 0.30 0.29 0.11
43Thus, it seems plausible to reduce the multi—factor approach to a single factor CAPM-type approach for regions
where an equity series is available.
44We use the maximum sample length available to all ﬁrms in one region.
45The remaining are t-tests.
31Across the ten regions, variation in the macroeconomic factors explains between 11% and 41%
of the total variations in ﬁrm returns, as measured by ¯ R2.I fw eh a v ec a p t u r e do v e r a l ls y s t e m a t i c
risk reasonably well, the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts in an all-U.K. portfolio (average ¯ R2 =0 .22) should
thus be greater than for an all- South East Asian portfolio (average ¯ R2 =0 .30), which seems to be
more driven by systematic risk. Consequently, similarly sized macroeconomic shocks should aﬀect
loans to South East Asian obligors to a higher extent than loans to U.K. obligors.
We now employ the MGE procedure in order to determine the overall signiﬁcance of the factors.
The results are summarized in Table 5.
Table 5
Mean Group Estimates of Factor Loadings
in Return Regressions
Number of
Factors MGE S.E. of MGE t-ratios Coeﬃcients








constant 0.05 0.01 4.97 119
∆y 0.25 0.47 0.54 119
∆2p -0.67 0.33 -2.02 119
∆q 0.59 0.06 9.73 115
∆(e − p) -0.07 0.09 -0.73 105
∆r -1.96 0.71 -2.76 119
∆m -0.14 0.24 -0.59 119
∆y∗ -2.38 0.94 -2.54 105
∆2p∗ -1.50 1.07 -1.41 105
∆q∗ 0.49 0.10 4.95 105
∆(e − p)∗ 0.10 0.15 0.62 14
∆r∗ 0.63 3.23 0.20 105
∆m∗ -0.88 0.45 -1.97 105
∆po 0.29 0.06 4.67 119
Based on the MG test results the statistically most signiﬁcant factors are, perhaps not sur-
prisingly, changes in domestic and foreign real equity prices (∆q and ∆q∗). The MGE of equity
prices have the expected signs and their magnitudes seem plausible. For example, the estimated
coeﬃcients of changes in domestic and foreign equity prices add up to 1.08, suggesting that the
composition of the loan portfolio closely matches that of a global market portfolio. Domestic in-
ﬂation (and to a lesser extent foreign inﬂation) and oil prices were also statistically signiﬁcant.
Both domestic and foreign inﬂation have negative eﬀects on returns, as to be expected. The overall
eﬀect of the oil price changes is, however, positive. This seems a reasonable outcome for energy
32and petrochemical companies and for some of the banks, although one would not expect this result
to be universal. In fact we do observe considerable variations in the individual estimates of the
coeﬃcients of oil prices changes across diﬀerent ﬁrms in our portfolio. In the ﬁnal regressions, of
the 119 ﬁrm regressions, the coeﬃc i e n to no i lp r i c ec h a n g e sw a sp o s i t i v ef o r8 9ﬁrms (about 75%
of the total), and negative for the remaining ﬁrms. The MGE for each subset was also signiﬁcant.
Among the remaining factors, interest rates and foreign output are also signiﬁcant. The latter
is diﬃcult to explain, particularly considering that domestic output is not statistically signiﬁcant
and foreign output has a wrong sign. In view of this we decided to exclude both of the output
variables from our subsequent analysis. Of the two interest rate variables we included the domestic
rate which had the correct sign.
Our concerns regarding multicollinearity were conﬁrmed by the regression results. Initially, we
included both foreign and domestic equity variables but found implausible (negative) estimates for
some of the multi-factor regressions, which we believe partly reﬂects the high correlation of ∆q
and ∆q∗ in some regions. Working with multi-factor regressions with perversely signed estimated
coeﬃcients is particularly problematic for the analysis of shock scenarios where the coeﬃcient of
equity prices plays a critical role in the transmission of shocks to the loss distribution. We ran two
sets of multi-factor regressions (including inﬂation, interest rate and the oil price variables); one
with ∆q and another with ∆q∗, and selected the regression with higher ¯ R2. The summary of the
ﬁnal set of multi-factor regressions and the associated MG estimates are given in Table 6. In this




Mean Group Estimates of Factor Loadings
The Preferred Model
Number of
Factors M G E S . E .o fM G E t - r a t i o s C o e ﬃcients








constant 0.02 0.004 6.33 119
∆2p -0.71 0.28 -2.52 119
∆q/∆q∗ 1.01 0.04 25.07 119
∆(e − p)∗ 0.07 0.15 0.46 14
∆r -1.82 0.65 -2.79 119
∆po 0.39 0.07 5.51 119
It is important to note that the simulation of the loss distributions are not based on the MG
estimates, but are computed using the 119 individual ﬁrm return regressions that allow for fully
heterogeneous factor loadings across ﬁrms. The individual estimates display a considerable degree
33of heterogeneity across ﬁrms, both in sign and in magnitude. The MG estimates and their standard
errors provide a useful summary of the extent to which parameter heterogeneity matters. They also
allow us to streamline the search process across alternative speciﬁcations of the return regressions.
Otherwise, we would have faced the daunting task of searching across all the 119 return regressions
separately. In addition to being highly time-consuming, such a procedure is also likely to be subject
to a much higher degree of pre-testing as compared to the selection procedure adopted above.
4.4 Simulated Conditional Loss Distributions
With the estimated GVAR model serving as the economic scenario generator and the ﬁtted multi-
factor regressions as the linkage between ﬁrms and the economy, we simulated loss distributions
one through four quarters ahead.46 A one year horizon is typical for credit risk management and
thus of particular interest. In addition to the loss distribution implied by the baseline forecast, for
each horizon we examined the impact of several shock scenarios:47
• a −2.33σ shock to real U.S. equity, corresponding to a quarterly drop of 14.28%,
• a +2.33σ shock to real German output, corresponding to a quarterly rise of 2.17%,
• a −2.33σ shock to real S.E. Asian equity, corresponding to a quarterly drop of 24.77%,
• a +2.33σ shock to Japanese real money supply, corresponding to a quarterly rise of 2.87%.
• a +2.33σ shock to the price of crude oil, corresponding to a quarterly rise of 16.01%.48
We also experimented with symmetric positive shocks to U.S. and S.E. Asian equity prices, and
a symmetric negative shock to the price of crude oil. These are of particular interest here since
their impacts on losses will not be (negatively) symmetric due to the nonlinearity of the credit risk
model. In addition we consider a stress scenario for the U.S. equity market as reported in PSW,
namely an adverse shock of 8.02σ. Such a large shock corresponds to a quarterly drop of 49% which
is the largest quarterly drop in the S&P 500 index since 1928 (which occurred in the three months
to May, 1932). It also corresponds to the recent decline from their peak in 2000 to a recent low (in
early October, 2002). Finally we include an intermediate negative equity shock of −5σ.
We carried out 200,000 replications for each shock scenario using Gaussian (compound) innova-
tions. For the forecasts and shock scenarios, we computed expected loss results using the analytic
46The important issue of credit risk model evaluation, especially for a regulator under BIS 2, is beyond the scope of
this paper; we plan to address it in subsequent work. See also Lopez and Saidenberg (2000). Lucas (2001) illustrates
the diﬃculty of this validation process in the easier context of market risk.
472.33σ corresponds, in the Gaussian case, to the 99% Value-at-Risk (VaR), a typical benchmark in risk manage-
ment.
48The price at the end of 1999Q1 was $12.31 a barrel (Brent Crude). A +2.33σ shock would raise the price to
$14.45.
34formula (using (32)) as well as by stochastic simulations, (37). The two sets of estimates turn
out to be within 0.5% (analytic baseline EL is 14.55bp for the ﬁrst quarter) so we only report the
simulated ones. The simulated expected and unexpected loss results are summarized in Tables 7a
and 7b, respectively, where each column represents a particular scenario. The scenarios are ordered
roughly in descending order (left to right) of loss impact.
[Insert Tables 7a and 7b about here]
We begin our discussion by looking at baseline losses. The expected baseline loss, seen in the
middle of Table 7a, over the course of four quarters is about 57.8bp (basis points) of exposure. Losses
occur more or less evenly throughout the four quarters, though the last generates the highest losses
(16.0bp) and the second quarter the lowest (12.8bp). As a basis of comparison, the average net
charge-oﬀs( l o a n sc h a r g e do ﬀ less amount recovered over total loans) for the U.S. banking industry
from 1987 to 2003 was about 89bp.49 Another point of comparison is with industry charge-oﬀsi n
2000Q1 since the expected losses of our portfolio are essentially a one-year forecast to 2000Q1 (our
sample ends in 1999Q1). Those were 56bp (at an annual rate). These results are quite realistic
and are consistent with our expectations raised in Section 4.2 that our average losses would be a
bit lower than the U.S. average since the average credit quality of our portfolio is higher: about
80% investment grade instead of the typical 50%. Of course, our portfolio has broad international
exposure, so we would not really expect to match the U.S. loss experience exactly.
From a risk perspective, it is not so much expected as unexpected loss which matters. This
is captured by the volatility or the standard deviation of losses summarized in Table 7b. For the
baseline, unexpected losses are almost double expected losses, about 106.0bp. The quarterly loss
volatilities are increasing over the four quarters; note that they are not additive over time as is the
case with average (expected) losses.
We now turn to the eﬀect of shock scenarios. A 2.33σ drop of real U.S. equity prices results in
an expected loss of 80bp over four quarters, about 38% above the baseline (Table 7a). The increase
in loss volatility is similar as can be seen in Table 7b: a 35% increase to 143bp. An inﬂationary
shock to Japanese real money supply of the same probabilistic size, namely 2.33σ, results in only
a less than 3% increase in both EL (to 59.3bp) and UL (to 107.5bp). The adverse shock to S.E.
Asian real equity prices is closer, in EL and UL terms, to the impact of the equiprobable adverse
U.S. equity shock. A benign shock to German real output reduced four quarter expected losses by
about 5% to 54.7bp, and unexpected losses by about 6% to 99.6bp.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
49These ﬁgures were calculate by the authors using U.S. bank regulatory reports Y-9C, the so-called “Call Reports.”
Details are available upon request.
35Of principal interest to risk managers is the tail of the loss distribution. Several of the shock
scenarios for the tails are summarized in Figure 1. The basic pattern established in the discussion
of expected and unexpected losses is conﬁrmed in the 99% and beyond tail of the loss distribution.
An inﬂationary shock to Japanese money supply increases credit losses somewhat relative to the
baseline loss distribution. A positive shock to German output reduces tail losses only modestly,
while adverse shocks to S.E. Asian and U.S. real equity prices increase tail losses, proportionately
similar to their impact on unexpected losses. For example, 99.5% baseline value-at-risk (VaR) is
about 6.86%, while it is 30% higher for the S.E. Asian equity shock scenario (at 8.91%) and 44%
higher for the U.S. equity shocks scenario (at 9.87%).
[Insert Table 8 about here.]
The tail values are around eight (99%) to twelve (99.5%) times expected losses for each scenario,
and around four to six times unexpected losses. The EL multiples are much higher than the re-
sampling based results in Carey (2002) who reported multiples closer to four for the case of the
U.S.; see especially his Table 3. Our portfolio is rather small, only 119 ﬁrms (Carey had about
500), and therefore has considerable potential for diversifying ﬁrm-speciﬁc risks. To evaluate the
consequences of reducing the idiosyncratic risk for the EL multiple, we focused on one quarter ahead
and carried out the simulations with each of the ﬁrms in the portfolio ‘copied’ 10 and 100 times to
arrive at an eﬀective portfolio of 1190 and 11,900 ﬁrms, respectively. The results are summarized
in Table 8 and show sizeable reductions in unexpected losses, from 30.83bp to 12.59bp for 10 copies
and just 8.85bp for 100 copies. Similar reductions can be seen in the tails. For instance, ﬁrst
quarter 99.5% VaR declines from 153.06bp to 63.14bp (53.67bp) when C = 10 (100).E L ,o fc o u r s e ,
remains virtually unchanged and very close to the analytic value of 14.55bp, as it should. Thus
much of the fat-tailedness of our loss distribution is due to the presence of signiﬁcant amount of
(diversiﬁable) idiosyncratic risk, and once this is controlled for, the EL to VaR multiples are in line
with Carey’s results.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Symmetric shocks do not result in symmetric outcomes, namely positive and negative shocks
o ft h es a m ea b s o l u t es i z ed on o th a v et h es a m ea b s o l u t ee ﬀects on loss distributions. Consider
ﬁrst expected and unexpected losses. While a negative shock to, say, S.E. Asian real equity prices
increased expected losses (Table 7a) by 28%, a positive shock reduces them only by 18%, namely
from 57.8bp to 47.4bp. Similarly, unexpected losses (Table 7b) increase by 23% under an adverse
scenario (from 106bp to 130bp) while they decrease just 16% (to 89.3bp) under a benign scenario.
This is conﬁrmed in the tails of the loss distribution for the pair of S.E. Asian real equity shock
scenarios displayed in Figure 2.
36The asymmetric reaction of losses to symmetric risk factor shocks is vividly illustrated with the
oil price shocks. Recall that the mean group estimate of oil price changes in the return regression
equation was found to be positive at 0.39 (see Table 6). Thus in Table 7a we see that a 2.33σ
drop in oil prices increases expected losses by 27% (from 57.8bp to 73.3bp) while a commensurate
increase reduces expected losses by only 12% (to 50.9bp). The relative impact is less dramatic on
loss volatility as seen in Table 7b. The −2.33σ oil price shock increases loss volatility by only 10%
(106.0bp to 116.7bp), the positive shock decreases loss volatility by just 6% (to 99.5bp).
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 shows the loss distribution of the two oil price shocks together with the baseline
distribution for the 95th percentile and beyond. For the majority of ﬁrms in our sample, an upward
shock to the oil price has benign eﬀects. Yet, there are also ﬁrms which move close to default in
the presence of an upward shock to the oil price (as one would expect for many industries). As we
have already seen, symmetric shocks do not result in symmetric changes to the loss distribution.
The increase in credit loss from an adverse shock is disproportionately larger than loss mitigation
from a benign shock of the same magnitude. While oil price shocks may have opposite eﬀects
on individual ﬁrm default risk, the adverse eﬀect tends to outweigh the benign one. Thus, it is
plausible within the portfolio context of our model that positive and negative shocks to the same
variable may both result in adverse eﬀects on credit loss.
One can clearly see just how steep, in this display manner, the loss curve becomes in the far
tail. Past a certain point, about the 99th percentile, losses increase dramatically. It is no accident
that credit risk managers focus on this region.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
What happens as the shocks become more and more extreme? This question is addressed in
Figure 4 for diﬀerent U.S. real equity shock scenarios: −5.00σ and −8.02σ, the latter matching
the largest quarterly drop in the S&P 500 index since 1928. We also display the baseline loss
distribution for comparison. To be sure, a shock as extreme as −8.02σ is, of course, outside the
bounds of the estimated model. It would be unreasonable to believe that such a large shock would
not result in changes of the underlying parameters. In particular, we note that the volatilities
remain constant, and while stressing volatilities would certainly be of interest (especially in light of
the nonlinearities already in the model), they require care so as to maintain coherence across the
error covariance matrix; such stress testing is beyond the scope of the present work. Nonetheless,
it is still instructive to examine the impact of an extreme shock given the constant volatility as one
way of stressing a credit risk model.
While a −2.33σ shock results in 99th percentile loss that is about 50% more than the baseline,
4.78% to 7.47%, a −5.00σ shock more than doubles 99% VaR, to 11.15%, and the extreme −8.02σ
37shock more than triples losses at this level, to 15.25% of exposure. Carey (2002), in his "Great
Depression" scenario ﬁnds that losses at the 99th percentile would be about triple his base case.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Financial institutions are ultimately exposed to macroeconomic ﬂuctuations in the global economy.
Their portfolios are typically suﬃciently large that idiosyncratic risk is diversiﬁed away, leaving
exposure to systematic risk. If business cycles are not perfectly correlated across countries and
regions, diversiﬁcation beneﬁts can be obtained by internationalizing one’s exposure. In this paper
we develop a Merton-type credit risk model which is linked to a global macroeconometric model that
explicitly allows for the interdependencies that exist between national and international factors. A
key challenge, which we address, is to allow for ﬁrm-speciﬁc business cycle eﬀects and heterogeneous
default thresholds.
The ﬁrst step in developing such a model is to build an economic engine reﬂective of the
environment faced by an internationally active global bank which is done in Pesaran, Schuermann
and Weiner (2004). For the credit portfolio component of our model we use a simple Merton-type
framework, modeling credit risk as a function of correlated equity returns of the obligor companies.
Equity returns are linked to the correlated macroeconomic variables contemporaneously through
return regressions. We then use the estimated global model as the economic engine for generating a
multi-period conditional loss distribution of a credit portfolio using stochastic simulation. Sampling
takes place along three lines: correlated random draws of macroeconomic factors; draws of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc risk components; and draws of stochastic loan loss severities. Finally we analyze the impact
of a shock to a set of speciﬁc macroeconomic variables on the loss distribution, allowing us to analyze
the eﬀect of a particular macroeconomic shock in one region on credit portfolios concentrated in
other regions, as well as shocks to risk factors, e.g. oil prices, aﬀecting all regions.
Our credit risk modeling approach has two other features of particular relevance for risk man-
agers: exploration of scale and symmetry of shocks on credit risk, and the ranking of shock impacts
on credit risk. First, we show that shocks not only have an asymmetric but also non-proportional
impact on credit risk due to the nonlinearity of the credit risk model. Because the Merton model is
an option-theoretic model, these traits echo characteristics of the options markets: large movements
in the underlying prices have disproportional eﬀects on the value of the option portfolio.
Second, the model allows us to rank the eﬀects of diﬀerent shocks on a global portfolio. Not
surprisingly, shocks to real equity prices seem to have the most signiﬁcant eﬀect on implied credit
losses, followed here by shocks to the price of crude oil. This ability for the model to produce relative
ranking of the impact of a variety of shocks on the credit portfolio may be of particular interest
to risk managers, who typically perform scenario analyses on a quarterly (or perhaps even more
frequent) basis. Moreover, the results of the risk impact analysis oﬀers natural hedging strategies
38and allow the manager to consider alternative strategies such as reallocation or derivative solutions
to managing the largest risks associated with a portfolio.
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Mean (Expected Loss) of Simulated Losses for 1 through 4 Quarters Ahead  
(in Basis Points of $ Exposure)
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4Q  235.2 123.3  80.0 74.2 73.3 59.3 57.8  54.7 50.9 47.4 43.3
Q1  105.9 37.6 21.2 19.3 23.8 14.7 14.5  14.2 11.8 11.8 10.2
Q2  51.3 28.0 17.8 16.4 16.3 13.3 12.8  12.2 11.1 10.5 9.7
Q3  40.8 28.7 19.7 18.4 16.5 14.9 14.5  13.4 12.8 11.9 11.0
Q4  37.1 28.9 21.3 20.0 16.7 16.4 16.0  14.9 15.2 13.2 12.3
 
                                                      




Standard Deviation (Unexpected Loss) of Simulated Losses for 1 through 4 Quarters Ahead  
(in Basis Points of $ Exposure)
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4Q  304.6 205.0 143.0 130.0 116.7 107.5 106.0  99.6 99.5 89.3 80.9
Q1  103.2 51.9 37.4 35.0 37.7 30.9 30.8  30.6 28.8 28.0 25.9
Q2  98.2 62.7 41.1 37.2 35.5 31.8 31.2  30.1 29.0 27.8 25.9
Q3  84.6 71.5 53.7 49.4 42.1 41.3 40.9  38.2 38.7 34.7 31.9
Q4  78.4 72.2 60.2 56.8 46.2 49.1 48.6  45.5 49.7 41.7 38.8
 
                                                      





Granularity and Firm-specific Risk 
One Quarter Ahead Losses, Each Firm Copied C Times for a Total of 119×C Exposures 
(in Basis Points of $ Exposure)
3 
  C = 1  C = 10  C = 100 
EL 14.56  14.54  14.56 
UL 30.83  12.59  8.85 
99.0% VaR  134.79  55.56  46.45 
99.5% VaR  153.06  63.14  53.67 
99.9% VaR  197.10  82.81  71.31 
 
                                                      




51A Supplement: An Overview of the GVAR Framework
This supplement presents a synopsis of the global vector autoregressive model (GVAR) as a gen-
erator of global macroeconomic dynamics and scenarios. It gives an overview of the framework
underlying the GVAR without going into the details of estimation techniques.1
A.1 Country/Region SpeciﬁcM o d e l s
The GVAR assumes that there are N +1country/regions in the global economy, indexed by
i =0 ,1,...,N,w h e r e0 is the reference country or region (taken to be the U.S.).2 Macroeconomic
variables of each region are modeled as a function of both their own past and the global economy’s
current and past state. It is assumed that the regional variables are related to deterministic variables
(such as a time trend), foreign variables (which are region-speciﬁc weighted averages of the rest
of the world) and variables that are taken to be exogenous to this global economy, such as the oil
price. We specify the following vector autoregressive form for ki variables:3
xit = ai0 + ai1t + Φixi,t−1 + Λi0x∗
it + Λi1x∗
i,t−1 + Ψi0dt + Ψi1dt−1 + εit,
t =1 ,2,...,T; i =0 ,1,2,...,N, (A.1)
where xit is the ki × 1 country-speciﬁc factors/variables, ai1 is a ki × 1 vector of linear trend
coeﬃcients, Φi is a ki×ki matrix of associated lagged coeﬃcients, x∗
it is the k∗
i ×1 vector of foreign
variables speciﬁct oc o u n t r yi (to be deﬁned below) with Λi0 and Λi1 being ki×k∗
i matrices of ﬁxed
coeﬃcients, dt is an s×1 vector of common global variables assumed to be exogenous to the global
economy with Ψi0 and Ψi1 being ki × s matrices of ﬁxed coeﬃcients, and εit is a ki × 1 vector of
country-speciﬁc shocks assumed to be serially uncorrelated with a zero mean and a non-singular
covariance matrix, Σii =( σii, s),w h e r eσii, s = cov(εi t,ε ist), or written more compactly
εit v i.i.d.(0,Σii). (A.2)
Although the model is estimated on a regional basis, we allow for the shocks to be correlated across






= Σij for t = t0,
= 0 for t 6= t.
Interactions take place through three distinct, but interrelated channels:
1. Direct dependence of xit on x∗
it and its lagged values.
1These can be found in Pesaran, Schuermann and Weiner (2004), hereafter referred to as PSW.
2For simplicity we will refer to regions only. For more on country to region aggregation, see PSW.
3Although easily extended to incorporate lags greater than one, the GVAR(1) speciﬁcation given above is seen as
suﬃcient for the illustrative purposes of this paper. Typical values for ki are 5 or 6.
12. Dependence of the region-speciﬁc variables on common global exogenous variables such as oil
prices.
3. Non-zero contemporaneous dependence of shocks in region i on the shocks in region j,m e a -
sured via the cross country covariances, Σij.
The individual models are estimated allowing for unit roots and cointegration assuming that
region-speciﬁc foreign variables are weakly exogenous, with the exception of the model for the U.S.
economy which is treated as a closed economy model.4 The U.S. model is linked to the outside
world through exchange rates themselves being determined in rest of the region-speciﬁcm o d e l s .
While models of the form in equation (A.1) are relatively standard, PSW show that the careful
construction of the global variables as weighted averages of the other regional variables leads to
a simultaneous system of regional equations that may be solved to form a global system. They
also provide theoretical arguments as well as empirical evidence in support of the weak exogeniety
assumption that allows the region-speciﬁc models to be estimated consistently.
A.2 The Global Model and Multi-step Ahead Forecasts
In view of the contemporaneous dependence of the domestic variables, xit,o nt h ef o r e i g nv a r i a b l e s ,
x∗
it,t h er e g i o n - s p e c i ﬁc VAR models (A.1) still need to be solved simultaneously for all the domestic
variables, xit,i=0 ,1,...,N. The global solution to the model yields a k × 1 vector xt,w h i c h
contains the macroeconomic variables of all regions, such that xt is a function of time, the lagged
values of all macroeconomic variables xt−1 and the exogenous variables common to all regions (and
their lags):





0 is the global k × 1 vector, where k =
PN
i=0 ki is the total number of the
endogenous variables in the global model, b0 and b1 are k × 1 vectors of coeﬃcients, z is a k × k
matrix of coeﬃcients, dt is an s × 1 vector of common global variables assumed to be exogenous
to the global economy (here to be the oil price) with corresponding k × s matrices of coeﬃcients,
Υ0 and Υ1.5 Finally, ut is a k ×1 vectors of (reduced form) shocks that are linear functions of the




the k × k matrix of coeﬃcients G is deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n3o fP S W .W ea l s oh a v e
Va r(ut)=G−1ΣεG0−1, (A.4)
where Σε=Va r(εt).
4Problems of estimation and testing of cointegrating models with weakly exogenous variables is discussed in
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2000).
5The exact relationships between the parameters of the GVAR model in (A.3), and those of the underlying
region-speciﬁcm o d e l s( A . 1 )a r eg i v e ni nP S W .
2In what follows we assume that the GVAR model is estimated over the period t =1 ,2,...,T, and
the objective of the exercise is to generate forecasts, both unconditionally as well as conditional on
a particular shock scenario, over the period t = T +1,...,T+n,w i t hn being the forecast horizon.
Accordingly, all forecasts and loss distributions at diﬀerent forecast horizons, n =1 ,2,...,w i l lb e
conditioned on the state of the economy as characterized by the GVAR model and all the available
information at the end of the sample period (i.e. time T), namely ΩT =( xT,dT,xT−1,dT−1,...).
For multi-step ahead forecasting and impulse response (or shock scenario) analysis the above
solution to the GVAR model needs to be augmented with a model for the common global variables
dt. To this end we adopt the following autoregressive speciﬁcation
dt = µd + Φddt−1 + εdt, for t = T +1 ,T+2 ,...,T+ n, (A.5)
where εdt v i.i.d. (0,Σd), which are assumed to be distributed independently of the macroeconomic
shocks, εt,t= T +1 ,T +2 ,...,T + n. We shall assume that all the eigen values of Φd lie on or
inside the unit circle and ∆dt is stationary with a constant mean.
For multi-step analysis it is convenient to stack up the macroeconomic (A.3) and global (A.5)
equations, and solve out the contemporaneous eﬀect of dt on xt to yield
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The (k + s) × 1 vector, υt, augments the region-speciﬁc shocks of interest, εt,w i t ht h ec o m m o n
global shocks, εdt. In the presence of unit root and cointegration it is desirable to ensure that the
trend coeﬃcients, δ, are restricted so that the trend characteristics of yt are not aﬀected by the
number of unit roots in Φ.T h i si sa c h i e v e db ys e t t i n g
δ =( I − Φ)γ, (A.9)








6For further details and discussions see Section 4 in PSW.









This solution has three distinct components: The ﬁrst component, ΦnyT,m e a s u r e st h ee ﬀect of
initial values, yT, on the future state of the system. The second component captures the determin-
istic trends embodied in the underlying VAR model. Finally, the last term in (A.10) represents the
stochastic (unpredictable) component of yT+n.
As we shall see below, for the purpose of simulating the loss distribution of a given portfolio,





yT + g(T,n)+UT+n, (A.11)
where












E (∆yT+n | ΩT)=
¡
Φn − Φn−1¢
yT + g(T,n), (A.14)






Φτ − Φτ−1¢0 . (A.15)
If it is further assumed that the region-speciﬁcs h o c k s ,εt, and the common global shocks, εdt, are
normally distributed, we then have8
∆yT+n | ΩT v N
©¡
Φn − Φn−1¢











Φτ − Φτ−1¢0 , (A.17)
and








7That is because returns are modeled as being driven by changes in systematic factors in Section 3.
8It is also possible to work with non-Gaussian shocks.
4Finally, in the present application where the underlying GVAR model admits unit roots and cointe-
gration, the limit distribution of ∆yT+n | ΩT exists and is ﬁnite if δ =(I − Φ)γ,o t h e r w i s eg(T,n)








and it is easily seen that
lim
n→∞[g(T,n)] = Φ∗µ+(I − Φ∗)γ,
where Φ∗ =l i m n→∞ (Φn) is ﬁnite under our assumptions. More speciﬁcally, if δ =(I − Φ)γ we
have
lim
n→∞∆yT+n | ΩT v N {Φ∗µ+(I − Φ∗)γ, Ψ∗},
where9







Φτ − Φτ−1¢0 .
Therefore, as argued in Section 4 of PSW, it is important that the GVAR model is estimated
subject to the restrictions, b1 =( I − z)γ1, which in conjunction with the model for the common
global variables, (A.5), ensure that δ =(I − Φ)γ.
In summary, the GVAR’s sequential regional estimation and global aggregation methodology
allows for the practitioner to solve for the conditional distribution of the macroeconomic factors
globally, whereas single-stage estimation of the global system in equation (A.3) would be prohibitive
due to the very large number of coeﬃcients and generally thin data sets. As a result, the model
allows us to examine the eﬀects of a shock in one region on the macroeconomic factors that describe
the system globally, as our discussion of impulse response functions below shows.
B Simulation of Multi-period Returns







µji,T+τ|T + ξji,T+τ, for κ =1 ,2,...,H, (A.20)
where




















decay exponentially with τ even under unit roots and hence Ψ
∗
exists and is ﬁnite.
5and g(T,n) is given by (A.19). It is clear that at time T, the conditional mean returns, µji,T+κ|T,
κ =1 ,2,...,H,are known insofar as they are forecast by the GVAR. It is also easily seen that the
unpredictable components of the returns over the diﬀerent horizons have the following recursive









jiHH−2DυT+2 + .... + Γ0
jiH0DυT+H + ηji,T+H,
where
Hκ = Φκ − Φκ−1, κ =1 ,2,...,H and H0 = Ik+s.
Recall that the matrix Φ collects all the GVAR coeﬃcients other than constants and trends and
thus characterizes the eﬀect of initial values yT on the future state of the macroeconomic system as
given by (A.6). Therefore, the conditional distribution of the returns across the diﬀerent forecast
horizons are correlated, and in the simulation of the loss distribution one needs to draw from the
joint distribution of rji(H)=( rji,T+1,r ji,T+2,...,r ji,T+H)
0. For this purpose we note that ξji,T+κ,





















Γji, if w 6= n,
where B = DΣυD0.
Alternatively, when the shocks are Gaussian the returns can be simulated using the relations
r
(r)
ji,T+κ = µji,T+κ|T + ξ
(r)



























ijH are independent draws from IID N(0,1) for all i and
j.
C Shock Scenario Analysis through GIRFs
For policy analysis, one would like to be able to examine how an isolated contemporaneous shock
to one macroeconomic variable aﬀects all other macroeconomic variables in the global economy.
6For example, it might be of interest to determine the eﬀects of a contemporaneous 10% drop in the
Japanese equity prices on other macroeconomic variables, and the eﬀects that these have on the
credit risk of a given portfolio. Impulse response functions provide us with the tools to carry out
this type of analysis. In so doing, it is of course important that the correlations that exists across
the diﬀerent shocks, both within and across regions, are properly taken into accounted. However,
in a model which consists only of regional VAR’s (as in equation (A.1)) which are not integrated as
in the GVAR, it is impossible to uncover these eﬀects because the interdependencies within regions
are lost. On the other hand, single-stage estimation of the global model (A.3) is extremely diﬃcult,
and even if it were possible (and consistent), it would be impossible to construct a regional shock
(a shock to εit) within the context of such a global model. Only with the GVAR can both of these
challenges be adequately addressed.
In the traditional VAR literature this is accomplished by means of the orthogonalized impulse
responses (OIR) à la Sims (1980), where impulse responses are computed with respect to a set of
orthogonalized shocks, say ξt, instead of the original shocks, εt. The link between the two sets of
shocks are given by
ξt = P−1εt,
where P is a k×k lower triangular Cholesky factor of the variance covariance matrix, Va r(εt)=Σε,
namely
PP0 = Σε.
Therefore, by construction E(ξtξ0
t)=Ik. However, the drawback of using OIR is that the outcome
is dependent on the order of the variables.10 Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) and Pesaran and
Shin (1998) have developed an approach which is invariant to the order of the variables, known
as the generalized impulse response function (GIRF). The GIRF can be applied to region-speciﬁc
shocks as well as to the common global shocks. For example, if factor   in country i is (purposefully)








− E (yT+n | ΩT).
The ﬁrst term captures the expected eﬀect of the shock, while the second term represents the













Φn−1DΣυsi , n =1 ,2,..., (A.24)
10This is due to the non-uniqueness of the Cholesky decomposition. While OIR are suitable for low-dimensional
models where variables can be arranged in causal order, they are not suitable for large dimensional GVAR models.
7where si  is a (k + s) × 1 selection vector with its element corresponding to the  th variable in
country i being unity and zeros elsewhere. A similar expression can also be derived for the eﬀect of
shocking one of the common global variables by an appropriate choice of the selection vector, s,a n d
by replacing √σii,   with the one standard error of the common global variable being shocked.11
The GIRF of the changes in the n-period ahead forecast, ∆yT+n, can also be derived directly










DΣυsi ,f o rn =2 ,3,..
Clearly, on impact (for n =1 ), ψi (y,n)=ψi (∆y,n), but the two impulse response functions
deviate at higher order horizons.
Finally, to analyze the impact of shock scenarios on the loss distribution, we also need to consider
the eﬀect of region-speciﬁc and common global shocks on the whole probability distribution function
of ∆yT+n conditional on ΩT. For this purpose we assume that the magnitude and the nature of
the shock is not such as to alter the probability distribution function of υT+1, and distinguish
between the cases where the change in εi,T+1,  is pre-announced or anticipated, as compared to
the case where the change is unanticipated. The former could be relevant in the case of policy
announcements such as speciﬁc tax changes or general changes to the monetary policy. But for
risk analysis unanticipated forms of shocks seem more relevant. Assuming that the errors, υT+1,
are distributed as multivariate normal (even after the system is hit by the shock), the probability
distribution in the presence of an unanticipated unit shock to  th factor in country i is given by
∆yT+n | ΩT,ε i,T+1,  =
√
σii,   v N
¡¡
Φn − Φn−1¢
yT + g(T,n)+ψi (∆y,n), Ψn
¢
, (A.26)
where ψi (∆y,n),a n dΨn are deﬁned by (A.24) and (A.17). Here we are assuming that the shock,
if unanticipated, does not change the conditional covariance matrix of υT+1.12
When the shock is anticipated its variance as well as its covariances with the other components
of υT+1 will be zero on impact and we have
∆yT+n | ΩT,ε i,T+1,  =
√
σii,   v N
¡¡
Φn − Φn−1¢




Ψn,i  = Bi , for n =1 , (A.28)







Φτ − Φτ−1¢0 , for n =2 ,3,...
11The GIRF are identical to the orthogonalized impulse response function only when Συ is diagonal and/or when
the focus of the analysis is on the impulse response function of shocking the ﬁrst element of υt.S e e P e s a r a n a n d
Shin (1998).
12In principle it is possible to allow for simultaneous mean and variance change, for example, by adopting GARCH-
in-mean type models where conditional variance is assumed to be depend on the conditional mean of the errors.
8Bi  = D
h
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